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Individual and Group Gender: Moderators for
Atributions, Perceptions, and Opinions
The percentage of women who make up the white collar labor
force has steadily increased. In the last decade alone, the
percentage of management positions held by women has jumped from
17.6% to 27.5% (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1983). This
movement of women into management has made more critical than
ever the need to investigate the perceptions that both men and
women hold about women in the business environment. In her
recent evaluation of the research literature on gender, Deaux
(1984) concluded that although research has shown that gender
stereotypes are pervasive, they are not an end in themselves.
She stated that current research should be directed toward "more
active interaction sequences, toward the processes through which
gender information is processed and acted upon" (p. 113) . This
is the area that the present study was designed to investigate.
This study examines the manner in which people react to
leadership behavior as displayed by both men and women in a
management context.
Previous Researc h on Sex-role Stereotyping
Attributions for Task Outcome. Much of the research in the
area of sex-role stereotyping is based on a model originally
outlined by weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum
(1972) to explain the differences found in attributions for task
outcomes. As applied to gender research, the theory states that
observers have certain expectations for performance based on
commonly held stereotypes of men and women. Causal attributions
2that observers make for the performance of males and females are
linked to these expectations. Differential expectations
therefore lead to differential attributions, even when the
outcome is the same. Attributions to stable, internal causes
are made when outcomes match expectancies, and attributions to
unstable causes are made when outcomes do not match
expectancies. The theory therefore predicts that if stereotypes
lead to the expectation that women will not succeed at a male
sex-typed task, then when women do in fact succeed, the outcome
will be attributed to unstable causes such as extra effort, or
luck. Conversely, if the expectancy for men is that they will
succeed at masculine tasks, their success will be attributed to
the stable, internal cause of ability.
Sex-role stereotyping was shown to occur in laboratory and
organizational settings in a series of studies by Rosen and
Jerdee, (1973, 1974a, 1974b, 1974c, 1975). Using both college
students and business executives as subjects, these researchers
performed a series of in-basket experiments in which they
demonstrated that sex-role stereotyping may occur in such
organizational processes as employment selection (Rosen and
Jerdee, 1974c, 1975)
,
placement (Rosen and Jerdee, 1974a, 1974b,
1974c) , disciplinary decisions (Rosen and Jerdee, 1974c) , and
preferences for supervisory behaviors (Rosen and Jerdee, 1973,
1974b, 1974c) . For example, in one experiment (Rosen and
Jerdee, 1974c) bank executives were asked to make promotion,
employee development, and supervisory decisions about
subordinates based on in-basket information. The subjects were
shown descriptions of individuals, with names having been
3changed in order to vary gender. The researchers found that
when these "paper people" were male, executives made decisions
that were more favorable to the subordinates than when they were
female. Rosen and Jerdee concluded that discrimination against
women in organizational decision-making was a pervasive problem.
In research along similar lines, Schein (1973, 1975)
developed descriptive indexes consisting of 92 adjectives and
descriptive terms that differentially described men and women.
Subjects were asked to check off items describing women in
general, men in general, or successful managers. She found that
successful middle managers were perceived as possessing
characteristics, attitudes, and temperaments that are more
commonly ascribed to men in general than to women in general.
Her results were obtained from samples of both male and female
managers. She concluded that "acceptance of stereotypical male
characteristics as a basis for success in management may be a
necessity for the woman seeking to achieve in the [then] current
organizational climate" (p. 343, 1975).
The fact that business tasks are generally viewed as
masculine raises questions about the experiences of female
managers. One conclusion is certain: All else equal, the
performance of women in business tasks is not perceived in the
same way as the performance of men.
It has been shown that when women succeed in business tasks
their success may be attributed to unstable factors such as
extra effort (Deaux & Taynor, 1973; Taynor & Deaux, 1975;
Feldman-Summers and Keisler, 1974; Reno, 1981) , or luck (Deaux &
Emswiller, 1974; Feather & Simon, 1975; Cash, Gillen, & Brown,
1977; Reno, 1981). Men's success is typically attributed to
relatively stable ability factors (Deaux & Emswiller, 1974;
Feather & Simon, 1975; Taynor & Deaux, 1975; Cash, Gillen, &
Burns, 1977) . Taynor and Deaux (1975) suggested that this is
due to stereotypes and biases that people hold about the
relative ability of men and women in various occupational roles.
It has been shown that there is a general devaluation of women
and feminine-typed roles, while masculine roles are generally
viewed as being both more difficult and more attractive
(Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz, & Vogel, 1970).
Consistent with this, Schein (1973, 1975) found that women were
perceived as being less competent in masculine roles than were
men. If a woman does manage to succeed at a masculine sex-typed
task then her success is attributed to luck and/or effort (e.g.,
Deaux & Taynor, 1973; Deaux & Emswiller, 1974) . In fact, some
research (Feather & Simon, 1975) indicates that women,
especially when being evaluated by other women, can gain more
approval by failing at a masculine-typed task, presumably
because failure on such tasks is more consistent with the
feminine sex-role.
These findings suggest that sex-role stereotyping may be
taking place in industry. The sex-role of managers is viewed as
masculine and women in management positions are therefore viewed
as acting outside of their sex-role. The present study will
test the hypothesis that in a managerial role, the gender of the
actor acts as a moderator for both attributions made by
observers and the resulting influence of the actor on observers'
opinions.
Attributions for Opinions
Discounting and Augmentation Principles. Attribution
processes have been studied extensively by psychologists
(Harvey, Ickes, & Kidd, 1976; Harvey & Weary, 1984)
.
Attribution theory seeks to explain how people make causal
attributions; that is, how they decide why events happen. In
particular, the theory deals with human behavior and the
attributions that naive observers make in order to explain why
others behave in a particular manner or why they hold certain
opinions. For the current research, the subject of interest is
the attributions that observers make for the opinions of others.
Kelley (1973) hypothesized that individuals, when exposed
to the opinion of another, engage in a causal analysis of the
opinion, relying on whatever information is available to them.
Kelley theorized that this processing of information is guided
by two basic dynamics: the discounting principle and the
augmentation principle. The discounting principle states that
when there are many possible causes that can be used to explain
a given outcome (e.g., opinion), the role of any one particular
cause in producing the outcome is discounted in the attribution
process. Augmentation is the converse of discounting: If there
are few possible causes to explain a given outcome, then the
perceived efficacy of one particular cause in producing the
outcome is enhanced or augmented.
In this case the outcome under consideration is the actor's
belief statements (e.g., "I believe we should hire a supervisor
from outside the organization."), we are interested in the
explanations that observers give for a communicator's position
6on an issue. Thus, if there are compelling and/or a large
number of external or situational explanations (e.g., material
reward) available for the actor's belief statements, an observer
will be less likely to attribute the statements to internal or
dispositional factors (e.g., personal beliefs). Thus, the
observer would "discount" internal factors in making the
attribution. Complementing this, if there are few internal
explanations available, an observer will be more likely to
utilize external explanations for the actor's opinion. Thus,
external factors are "augmented" in the observer's eyes.
Combining these principles, if there is evidence that the
communicator may receive rewards or other personal benefits as a
result of stating an opinion, especially if there is a lack of
evidence that he or she has personal or dispositional reasons,
then the opinion will likely be regarded by observers as being
insincere and lacking honesty.
Conversely, if there are few external explanations
available for the actor's beliefs, the observer will be more
likely to utilize internal explanations, while if there are many
personal or dispositional explanations available, the observer
will be less likely to make external or situational
attributions. That is, if there is evidence that the
communicator has personal or dispositional reasons for stating a
particular belief, especially if there is no evidence that he or
she may receive personal benefits or rewards, then an observer
will be more likely to regard the opinions as being a sincere,
honest expression of the actor's beliefs.
The discounting and augmentation principles work in tandem
7as a "subjective analysis of variance" (Kelly, 1973) . The
assumption is that the average person is a "naive psychologist"
and uses a naive version of the analysis of variance method.
The concept is guided by the covariation principle, viz., "an
effect is attributed to the one of its possible causes with
which, over time, it covaries" (Kelly, p. 108) . In the case of
a stated opinion the naive observer will note, or make
inferences about, whether dispositional or situational factors
covary with the speaker's opinion. Attributions made by the
observer for the speaker's opinion will be dependent on the
results of this naive analysis of covariance.
Knowledge Bias. Reporting Bias, and Veridicality
.
Eagly
and her associates (Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Eagly, Wood, &
Chaiken, 1978) expanded Kelley's original attributional analysis
of persuasion to include the communicator's personal
characteristics. Eagly described three causes to which a
communicator's statements can be attributed. First, observers
may attribute a communicator's statements to knowledge bias, or
a belief that the communicator's knowledge of external reality
is inaccurate. Second, observers may attribute the statements
to reporting bias, or a belief that the communicator is not
willing to portray an accurate version of reality. Third, if
both knowledge bias and reporting bias can be eliminated as
posible causes for the communicator 1 s statements, observers will
attribute the statement to external reality, or make a
veridicality attribution. According to Eagly, only the last
type of attribution will increase the level of communicator
influence.
8In order to substantiate their theory, Eagly, wood, and
Chaiken (1978) manipulated observers' perceptions of whether or
not a male communicator used biased information and whether or
not he changed his position on the issue for his audience. They
found that when observers believed that the communicator used
unbiased information and did not tailor his argument to his
audience, he was viewed as less biased, less manipulative, and
more sincere. Eagly et al. (1978) interpreted this as
indicating that when the communicator displayed objectivity and
accuracy about his message, internal motivations were attributed
to him, and he was therefore viewed more favorably by observers.
Effects of Benefittina/Sufferina on Attributions. In an
experiment that was designed in part to test the hypothesis that
people could actually reap benefits as a result of suffering,
Knight and Weiss (1980) had subjects read one of three
conditions of a bogus news article: the article stated that, as
a result of taking a public stand on a political issue, a male
actor either suffered, benefited, or no outcome was reported.
Knight and Weiss found that observers made stronger internal
attributions for the opinion of an actor who had suffered as a
result of his opinion and stronger external attributions for a
benefitting actor's opinion. They also found that the
observers' perceptions of an actor's honesty, independence, and
bias were all significantly more favorable when the actor
suffered as a result of his opinion. Thus, the researchers
suggested that the actor's benef itting/suf fering mediated the
relationship between the actors' communication and observers'
perceptions.
•
9As noted above, it has been found that when men succeed at
a task, their success is attributed to internal causes such as
skill (Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Feather & Simon, 1975; Taynor &
Deaux, 1975) . Knight and Weiss' (1980) research indicates that
there may be a mediator that affects attributions for
performance. Specifically, if a person is seen as reaping
personal benefits as a result of his or her opinion, then that
person may be attributed with external, situational motivations
without taking into account success or failure at the task (It
should be noted that benefitting as the result of one's opinion
is not equivalent to success at the task. The former refers to
the personal result to the individual decision-maker, while the
latter refers to the success or failure of the decision/task.
One might expect that if the observer views an actor as
being more honest, independent, and unbiased, the observer would
be more influenced by the actor's opinions. In fact, research
has shown that communicator characteristics such as honesty,
expertise (Hovland & Weiss, 1952; Walster, Aronson, & Abrahams,
1966) trustworthiness (Kelman & Hovland, 1953) , independence,
and lack of bias (Knight & Weiss, 1980) do have positive effects
on communicator effectiveness. Knight and Weiss found that
significantly more opinion change resulted when an actor
suffered (and his honesty, independence, and bias were rated
favorably) than when an actor benefited. Hierarchical
regression analysis also suggested that the attribution and
trait perceptions served as mediators between the actor's
communication and his influence (Knight & Weiss, 1980)
.
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Combining Two Paradigms
A major difference between the series of studies
investigating gender differences (e.g. Deaux & Emswiller, 1974)
and the series of studies investigating attributions for
opinions (e.g. Knight & Weiss, 1980) is the type information to
which subjects were exposed. In the studies conducted by Deaux
and her associates, the subjects were given information about
the actor's success or failure at a task. In Knight and Weiss'
(1980) research however, the cue was not success or failure, but
whether the actor had benefited or suffered as a result of his
opinions. These two manipulations represent very different
circumstances. One situation (i.e., success/failure) provides
information about the actor's objective performance on a task
while the other situation (i.e., benefit/suffer) provides
information about the personal consequences of the behavior to
the actor without reference to success or failure. An example
of the independence of these constructs would be a sitation in
which an actor is complimented or denigrated by another for his
or her behavior without any reference to whether the behavior is
effective or ineffective vis-a-vis the actor's goals.
A result of this difference in paradigms is that different
models of attribution are relevant to explain the two phenomena.
The line of research concerned with gender differences is best
explained by a model outlined by Weiner et al. (1972) which is
generally utilized as a model of attributions for task outcome.
The line of research concerned with attributions for opinions
best fits the model proposed by Kelley (1972) . This is the
model that will be used in the present study. Although the
11
research on gender differences is worded in terms of the task
outcome model, it is still applicable to the present research
and it can offer insights within the framework of Kelley's
model.
Proposed Research
Managerial decision-making has long been a focus of
research in psychology (Harrison, 1975; Pitz & Sachs, 1984)
.
Group decision-making in a management context, specifically the
consequences for a group that is unable to reach a consensus, is
the focus of the current research. If the group does not reach
a consensus, the dissenter (s) may be viewed positively or
negatively depending on situational characteristics. If one
individual reaches a different conclusion than the rest of the
group and the person experiences a positive consequence
(benefits) as a result of maintaining that position, then, based
on the results of the Knight and Weiss (1980) study, it would be
expected that he or she would be viewed as less honest, less
independent, and more biased. It is hypothesized that this
process would generally operate in management settings except
under conditions where certain other factors have an impact.
The two factors under consideration in the current study are the
sex-role of the task and gender of the actors.
Knight and Weiss (1980) found that, when an actor suffered,
observers made more internal attributions for his opinion, held
more postive perceptions of him, and were more influenced by his
opinion than when an actor benefitted. It is hypothesized that
the same results will be found for men and women in the current
study except during conditions in which gender is especially
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salient. When one man disagrees with a group made up of women
or one woman disagrees with a group made up of men, different
results from the Knight & Weiss (1980) are predicted.
The first case concerns one man in a decision-making group
made up of women. Typically, when an actor experiences positive
consequences as a result of holding a particular position, it is
hypothesized that he or she will be viewed more negatively by
observers unless there is evidence available to indicate that
the dissenter may have more authoritative knowledge than the
rest of the group (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1975) . Applying this
to the issue of sex roles, if the majority of the group members
are women and the individual who holds the differing opinion is
a man, it is hypothesized that he will be viewed as having more
authoritative knowledge than the women. Because people hold
stereotypes and biases about traditional sex-roles, a man
disagreeing with women should still be rated by observers as
having stable, internal motivations, even if he received
personal reward as a result of his opinion. The reason for this
prediction is that management tasks are seen as being consistent
with a masculine sex-role. The man, who is in his traditional
sex-role, is disagreeing with women, who are not in their
traditional sex-role. This perception on the part of observers
should result in beliefs that the man is basing his opinion on
reality, and should therefore decrease the probability of
attribution to reporting bias. This type of veridicality
attribution should outweigh the negative perceptions associated
with the positive consequences; the result should be internal,
stable attributions for his opinion.
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In terms of Eagly's (Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Eagly, Wood, &
Chaiken, 1978) analysis, if a person experiences positive
consequences as a result of an opinion, then an attribution of
reporting bias would be more likely since the communicator would
have something to gain by stating that opinion. In fact, that
is what Knight and Weiss (1980) found. In the case of a man
disagreeing with women however, it is expected that knowledge
bias and reporting bias will be eliminated by subjects as
possible causes for the actor's opinions by virtue of the fact
that he is in his appropriate sex role. The actor's opinions
will be attributed to reality as observers make a veridicality
attribution. This in turn should increase the level of his
influence on observers' opinions.
The second case in which results are predicted to differ
from those found by Knight and Weiss (1980) is when one woman
disagrees with a group made up of men. It is predicted that
actors' gender and sex role should have a moderating effect on
the attributions observers make for the actors' opinions. It is
further predicted that the combination of gender and the
masculine sex-role of management will affect the actors' ability
to influence the opinions that observers hold on the issue being
discussed. In the Knight and Weiss (1980) study it was found
that, by virtue of strong internal attributions made by
subjects, the suffering actor exerted more influence on
subjects' opinions. Consequently, subjects were more disposed
to agree with his view than they were when he benefited and was
attributed with external motivations. This would be the
expected result of such an interaction except when the masculine
14
sex role of management and the gender of the actors combine to
prevent the necessary attributions.
As stated earlier, when observers attribute an opinion to
stable, internal causes, they will be influenced by the actor's
opinion unless there is an overriding reason to believe that the
actor is in error. Returning to the group decision-making
situation, if the group members are men and the individual
holding the dissenting opinion is a woman, it is predicted that
she will not be influential, even if she experiences negative
consequences as a result of maintaining her opinions. Her
gender is expected to moderate her influence over observers'
opinions. Simply because she is seen as having strong
convictions will not be enough to influence observers' opinions
if they perceive that she is in a non-traditional sex-role and
therefore lacks the expertise to identify the correct decision.
She may suffer as a result of maintaining her opinion and be
admired for doing so, but that will not change the observers'
opinions that she could still be wrong.
In terms of Eagly' s extension of the attribution model,
there should be no attributions to reporting bias in the above
situation, since there is no apparent motivation for the woman
to misrepresent reality. Her opinions, however, will not be
attributed to veridicality, either. Instead, it is predicted
that her opinions will be attributed to knowledge bias. That
is, her opinion will be attributed to dispositional motives, but
her view of reality will be perceived by observers as
inaccurate. This in turn should decrease her level of influence
on observers' opinions. Consequently, even though observers
15
will make internal attributions for her opinions, they will not
be influenced by them.
The group composition in the situation of one woman and a
larger number of men has particular relevance to "real life."
Although women are currently increasing their numbers in the
ranks of management, they are still outnumbered by a ratio of
three to one (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1983) .
Consequently, it would not be uncommon for a woman to be the
sole representative of her gender in a management situation.
Hypothesis 1: Focal person gender will moderate the
effects of decision consequences and group gender on
attributions, perceptions, and subject opinions.
Specifically, positive consequences will result in
situational attributions, negative perceptions, and
relatively low influence over subjects' opinions
except when the focal person is male and the other
group members are female. In this case, there will be
dispositional attributions, positive perceptions, and
relatively high influence over subjects' opinions.
Conversely, negative consequences will result in
positive perceptions, dispositional attributions, and
relatively high influence over subject opinions,
except when the focal person is female and the other
group members are male. In this case, there will be
relatively little influence over subjects' opinions.
The proposed relationship between the factors that lead to
influence is a causal chain. It is predicted that subjects will
make attributions for opinions when they are stated by the
16
actors and subjects observe the consequences (positive or
negative) . They will also form perceptions about the characters
of actors. The attributions and perceptions will in turn
influence subjects' own opinions on the issue.
Hypothesis 2: Attributions and perceptions will
mediate the relationship between outcome consequences
and subjects' opinions.
No effects are predicted for subject gender since previous
research has either failed to find any significant effects
(Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Deaux & Taynor, 1973; Rosen & Jerdee,
1974a, 1974b; Schein, 1973, 1975) or has found only very minor
effects (Taynor & Deaux, 1975) .
Study I
Method
Sub j ects
Subjects were 160 undergraduate students enrolled at Kansas
State University; 98 (61%) were female and 62 (39%) were male.
They received credit toward fulfilling general psychology
requirements for their participation.
Task
Subjects read a transcript of a small group engaged in a
management decision-making task, followed by a short description
of the consequences of the group's decision. The issue in
question was whether to replace a retiring supervisor by hiring
a supervisor from outside the organization or by promoting an
employee from within the organization. The decision-making
17
group consisted of four persons in all conditions. When the
group reached a final decision, three of the members were in
agreement and one individual (hereafter refered to as the focal
person) arrived at a different opinion, when the final decision
was presented to their supervisor, the focal person's opinion
was presented with the group's decision as a minority position.
Manipulations
Group Gender. There were two conditions of group gender.
In the first condition, the three members of the group who
reached a consensus were male. In the second condition, the
three members were female. Group gender was manipulated by
changing the names of the group members on the transcript that
subjects were given to read (e.g., Mark/Marcia, Carl/Carol).
Focal Person Gender. There were two conditions for the
gender of the focal person who reached an independent decision.
In the first condition, the focal person was male and in the
second condition the focal person was female. Dissenter gender
was manipulated by changing the name of the focal person on the
transcript that subjects were given to read.
Decision Consequences. There were two conditions of
consequences resulting from the decisions reached. For the
condition in which the focal person experienced positive
consequences and the group experienced negative consequences,
the supervisor of the group, after reading over the two
decisions, complimented the focal person on his/her creativity,
suggested that the focal person had management potential, and
questioned the management potential of the other group members
(see Appendix A) . For the condition in which the focal person
18
experienced negative consequences and the group experienced
positive consequences, the supervisor complimented the group
members on their creativity, suggested that they had management
potential, and questioned the management potential of the focal
person (see Appendix B)
.
These three variables
—
group gender, individual gender, and
decision consequences—were orthoginally crossed to create eight
different conditions. In order to counterbalance the effects of
the arguments, there were two argument conditions. In one
condition the focal person argued to promote the new supervisor
from within the organization (see Appendix A) , while in the
other condition the focal person argued to hire from outside the
organization (see Appendix B) . Altogether four variables were
orthoginally crossed to create a2X2X2X2 factorial design.
Dependent Variables
Attributions. Subjects were asked to indicate, on
seven-point Likert scales, the extent to which each of eight
potential causes were the basis for the focal person's opinions
(see Appendix C) . Two items were distractors. Three of the
remaining six items represented dispositional causes (the focal
person's concern for the workers, the focal person's concern for
the company, and the focal person's beliefs about the workers).
The other three items represented situational causes (the focal
person's potential to benefit from his/her decision, the focal
person's desire to advance in the company, and the focal
persons' chance for reward) . The scales were reversed for three
of these items and all six items were averaged to form a
dispositional versus situational attribution measure. A
19
reliability analysis showed that this measure had a coefficient
alpha of .64.
Percept ions of the Focal Person. Fifteen seven-point
bipolar adjective scales originally developed by Knight and
Weiss (1980) were used to measure subjects' perceptions of the
focal person (See Appendix D) . Knight and Weiss had subjected
these items to a principal components analysis with varimax
rotation. Out of 12 of the items, 3 summary variables were
created on the basis of which items had the highest loadings for
each component. The three summary variables created were:
Honesty (positive poles of honest, sincere, trustworthy, and
principled)
, Mas (negative poles of biased, manipulative,
selfish, and opportunistic) , and Independence (positive poles of
independent, commited, unafraid, and consistent; Knight and
Weiss, 1980) . Scores on the summary variables were formed by
averaging the individual items.
For the current study, Knight and Weiss' (1980) fifteen
items were again subjected to a principal component analysis
with varimax rotation. In this case, the loading of the items
resulted in the identification of four summary variables:
Trustworthiness (positive poles of sincere, likeable,
trustworthy, nonmanipulative, and selfless) , Objectivity
(positive poles of unbiased, openminded, and intelligent)
,
Commitment (positive poles of honest, principled, independent,
commited, unafraid, and consistent) , and Opportunism (negative
pole of the single item nonopportunistic) . Scores on the
summary variables were formed by averaging individual items.
The reliabilities for all of the summary variables are displayed
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in Table 1. In order to facilitate comparison with Knight and
Weiss' (1980) results, all seven variables were used in the
statistical analyses.
Qpj.nj.ons. Subjects were asked to indicate which decision
they would make if they were in the group. They were presented
with three choices: hire from outside, promote from within, or
neither (See Appendix E)
.
Analyses
Analyses of variance were employed to test the moderating
effects of gender predicted by Hypothesis 1. Hierarchical
regression analyses were employed to test the mediating effects
of subjects' attributions and perceptions predicted by
Hypothesis 2.
Pilot Tests
'Hire from Outside' vs 'Promote from Within.' Scenarios
were developed in which the focal person argued from either side
of the hiring issue. In the first condition he/she argued to
hire the new supervisor from outside the organization and in the
second condition he/she argued to promote from within the
organization. The two conditions were created in order to avoid
confounding subjects' opinions on the issue with their responses
to the independent variables. Pilot testing was therefore
necessary in order to ensure that the arguments employed on
either side of the issue were viewed as being equally persuasive
by subjects. Pilot subjects were asked to rate the strength of
each argument and the scenarios were revised based on this
feedback.
The measure of argument strength consisted of seven-point
Table 1
Reliability of Perceptions of the Focal Person Measures
Measures Alpha
Original Measures (Knight & Weiss, 1980)
Honesty .82
(honest, sincere, trustworthy, & principled)
Bias .72
(biased, manipulative, selfish, & opportunistic)
Independence .58
(independent, committed, unafraid, & consistent)
New Measures
Trust .81
(sincere, likeable, trustworthy,
nonmanipulative, & selfless)
Objectivity .71
(unbiased, openminded, and intelligent)
Commitment .79
(honest, principled, independent, committed,
unafraid, & consistent)
Opportunism *
(opportunistic)
* The item opportunistic loaded .89 on the fourth component
derived from the Principle Components Analysis.
21
22
bipolar adjective scales (1 = "Excellent," 7 = "Terrible") used
in response to the requests: "Rate the strength of the argument
'Hire from outside'"; and "Rate the strength of the argument
'Promote from within.'" After a series of approximately eight
pilot tests and revisions, no significant differences were found
in the final test between subjects' ratings of the strength of
focal person's and the group's arguments for either the
condition in which the focal person argued to hire from outside
the organization (£ (22) = .98, jj > .10) or the condition in
which he argued to promote from within (i (22) = .72, p. >
.10).
Subjects were also asked the question, "Which side do you
think presented the better argument?" A seven-point Likert
scale was employed to measure responses (1 = "Hire from
Outside," 4 = "Equal Arguments," 7 = "Promote from Within").
There were no significant differences between subjects' ratings
of the two arguments. Table 2 contains the means and standard
deviations for these variables.
Decision Consequences vs Correct/Incorrect. Additional
pilot testing was necessary in order to avoid confounding the
decision consequences conditions with the issue of correctness.
It was necessary to test whether, when the supervisor
complimented one party for creativity, subjects perceived the
complimented party as necessarily having made the correct
decision. Pilot subjects were presented with conditions that
contained identical dialogue between the decision makers. The
only aspect that varied was that in one condition the supervisor
complimented the focal person and in the other condition the
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Argument Strength
and Argument Preference for Each Argument Condition
Focal Person Argues 'Hire from Outside'
Argument Strength*
jea sd
Position
Hire from outside 2.25 1.13
Promote from within 2.25 .87
Which side presented better argument?** 3.58 1.72
Focal Person argues 'Promote from Within'
Position
Argument Strength*
a sd
Hire from outside 2.50 1.08
Promote from within 2.83 1.19
Which side presented better argument?** 4.00 1.91
* Low values indicate stronger arguments
** Low values indicate preference for 'Hire from Outside'
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supervisor complimented the other group members. Based on
subjects' feedback, the scenarios were revised approxmately
eight times so that both arguments were rated as equally correct
whether the proponent experienced positive or negative
consequences as a result.
The scales employed to measure subjects' reactions were the
same seven-point Likert scales that were employed in the
previous pilot test. In the final scenario, for the condition
in which the focal person argued to hire from outside, there
were no significant differences in subjects' ratings of argument
strength whether he/she experienced positive or negative
consequences (i (23) = .91, e > .10) . There were no
significant differences between ratings of the focal person'
s
and the group's arguments when the focal person experienced
positive consequences (£ (22) = .18, e > -10) or negative
consequences (i (22) = 1.07, e > .10). The same results were
obtained when the focal person argued to promote from inside.
There were no significant differences in ratings of the focal
persons' s arguments when he experienced positive or negative
consequences (i (22) = .55, p > .10). There were no
significant differences between ratings of the focal person's
and group's arguments whether the focal person experienced
positive consequences (£ (22) = .93, n.s.) or negative
consequences (i (22) = .92, E > .10) . Table 3 contains the
means and standard deviations for these analyses.
Table 4 indicates that the second pilot test supported the
validity of the first pilot test. There were still no
significant differences between the mean ratings of the two
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Argument Strength
for Each Argument Condition
and Each Decision Consequence Condition
Focal Person Argues 'Hire from Outside'
Argument Strength*
Consequence for Focal Person Group
Focal Person
Positive M = 2.50 2.58
SD = 1.24 1.67
Negative 2.08 2.50
1.00 .90
Focal Person Argues 'Promote from Within'
Argument Strength*
Consequence for Focal Person Group
Focal Person
Positive a = 2.17 2.58
SD = .94 1.24
Negative 2.33 2.67
.49 1.15
* Low values indicate stronger arguments
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Argument Preference
for Each Argument Condition
and Each Decision Consequence Decision
Focal Person Argues 'Hire from Outside'
Argument Preference*
Consequence for M. SD
Focal Person
Positive 3.08 1.54
Negative 3.75 1.56
Focal Person Argues 'Promote from Within'
Argument Preference*
Consequence for a SD
Focal Person
Positive 4.17 1.75
Negative 3.58 1.73
Low values indicate preference for 'Hire from Outside'
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two argument conditions when the focal person experienced
positive consequences (i (22) = 1.60, e >.10) or negative
consequences (£ (22) = .25, E >.10). That is, subjects still
perceived the two arguments as being equally persuasive.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Subjects were asked to indicate whether the focal person or
the group of three had experienced positive or negative
consequences (see Appendix F) . As expected, the focal person
was perceived as experiencing positive consequences in the
positive condition, £ (1,158) = 664.98, e < .0001, « 2 = .81,
and experiencing negative consequences in the negative
condition, £ (1,158) = 932.68, £ < .0001, a 2 = .86.
Similarly, the group was perceived as experiencing positive
consequences in their positive condition, £ (1,159) = 179.97, e
< .0001, o2 = .54, and negative consequences in their
negative condition, £ (1,159) = 772.91, e < .0001, Q2 = .83.
Table 5 contains the means and standard deviations for these
analyses.
Pilot testing had been conducted in order to operationalize
the concept of decision consequences as distinct from
correct/incorrect (see Appendix F) . In order to check this
manipulation, subjects were asked to indicate whether they
viewed the focal person and the group as being correct or
incorrect. The correctness responses were correlated with the
decision consequences condition to which the subjects were
exposed for both the focal person (x = .23, e < •"!) and the
group (x = .32, e < .001) . In order to investigate the
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations
of Perceived Benefiting, Suffering, Correctness
for Decision Consequence Conditions
Consequence for Focal Person
Positive Negative
Did Individual
Benefit?* SD
= 1.93
= .27
Did Individual
Suffer?*
1.01
.11
Was Individual
Correct?*
1.80
.40
Was Individual
Incorrect?*
1.20
.40
Did Group
Benefit?*
1.04
.19
Did Group
Suffer?*
1.74
.44
Was Group
Correct?*
1.30
.46
Was Group
Incorrect?*
1.70
.46
1.02
.16
1.93
.25
1.59
.49
1.41
.50
1.95
.22
1.03
.15
1.63
.49
1.38
.49
* High values indicate response was "Yes"
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mediating effects that subjects' perceptions of the correctness
had between the decision consequences and their opinions on the
issue, a new variable was formed. Four questions were asked
concerning the correctness of the decisions of the parties
involved (Was the individual correct? was the individual
incorrect? was the group correct? Was the group incorrect?)
.
The scales for two of these questions were reversed and the
responses were averaged to form a measure of the perceived
correctness of opinions. A reliability analysis of the new
correct/incorrect measure resulted in a coefficient alpha of
.88. The relationship between the new measure and the decision
consequences manipulation was found to be significant (x =
.23, 2 < .01). When either the focal person or the group
experienced positive consequences, subjects rated their argument
as being correct and when they experienced negative
consequences, subjects rated their argument as being incorrect.
This finding had significant implications for the study, which
will be discussed below.
Attributions
Analyses of variance did not reveal a relationship between
any of the independent variables and attributions made for the
communicators' opinions. Thus, many of the predictions were not
supported.
Hypothesis 1 stated that individual and group gender would
act as moderators of the relationship between the decision
consequences and observers' perceptions and attributions. More
specifically, for the case where a male focal person disagreed
with male group members and experienced positive consequences it
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was predicted that he would be viewed as having unstable,
external motivations. However, when a male disagreed with
female group members, it was predicted that the man would be
viewed as having stable, internal motivations whether he
experienced positive or negative consequences as a result of his
opinion. Conversely, when a woman disagreed with male group
members, it was predicted that she would be viewed as having
unstable, external motivations whether she experienced positive
or negative consequences. These predictions were based on the
premise that males would be viewed as acting within their
traditional sex-role while females would be viewed as acting
outside of their traditional sex-role. The evidence for these
effects would be demonstrated by a three-way interaction between
focal person gender, group gender, and decision consequences.
After disagreeing with either men or women, the opinion of a
female was expected to be attributed to external motivations
when she experienced positive consequences and to internal
motivations when she experienced negative consequences.
However, these results were not found with either a two-way
interaction between focal person gender and decision
consequences or a three-way interaction between all three
independent variables. The interaction of focal person gender,
group gender, and decision consequences was not significant, £
(1,159) = .00, E > .10. Table 6 contains the means and standard
deviations for the analysis.
Perceptions of the Focal Person
The attribution measure (high scores = internal
attributions) was positively correlated with the original
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Decision Consequences X
Group Gender X Focal Person Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Attribution*
Positive Consequences for Focal Person
Group Gender
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Male M. = 2.55 2.63
SD = .92 .97
Female 3.00 2.72
1.01 1.11
Negative Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male M. = 2.67 2.72
SD = .97 1.11
Female 2.77 2.54
2.54 .89
* Low values indicate dispositional attributions,
high values indicate situational attributions
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(Knight & Weiss, 1980) measures of Honesty (i = .44, p <
.001), Bias (i = .47, p < .001), and Independence (£ = .34,
p. < .001) , and also with the current perception measures of
Trustworthiness (£ = .45, p < .001) , Objectivity (£ = .34, p
< .001), Commitment (x = .40, p < .001), and Opportunism (£
=
.23, p < .001). This indicates that when actors' opinions
were attributed to internal motives, they were also perceived as
more honest, independent, trustworthy, objective, committed, and
less biased and less opportunistic by the subjects. When their
opinions were attributed to external motives, they were
perceived less favorably by observers. The correlational
relationships, however, demonstrate no cause and effect. These
findings were as expected, and have been demonstrated in
previous research.
Hypothesis 1 stated that individual and group gender would
act as moderators for the relationship between the decision
consequences and observers' perceptions. As in the case of
attributions, these effects would be demonstrated by a three way
interaction between the three independent variables: focal
person gender, group gender, and the decision consequences
manipulation. Since observers' attributions were not
significantly affected by the manipulations, however, one might
not expect perceptions of the focal person to be affected
either. For six of the seven perception variables, this was the
case; there were no significant three-way interactions when
these variables were employed as dependent measures. The means
and standard deviations for these analyses are presented in
Tables 7 through 12. There was a significant three-way
Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations of Decision Consequences X
Group Gender X Focal Person Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Honesty*
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Positive Consequences for Focal Person
Group Gender
Male
Female
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
a = 1.94
SD = 1.87
2.31
.95
1.94
.87
2.29
.87
Negative Consequences for Focal Person
Group Gender
Male
Female
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
M = 2.01
SD = .72
2.00
1.89
2.26
1.26
2.60
1.09
* Low values indicate perceptions of honesty
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations of Decision Consequences X
Group Gender X Focal Person Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Bias*
Positive Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male
Female
!i = 3.35
SD = 1.20
3.36
1.16
3.55
1.09
3.74
.70
Negative Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male
Female
H = 3.15
SD = .89
3.65
1.02
3.59
1.24
3.45
1.27
* High values indicate perceptions of bias
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Table 9
Means and standard Deviations of Decision Consequences X
Group Gender X Focal Person Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Independence*
Positive Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male M. = 1.80 1.69
SD = .87 .62
Female 1.90 2.03
.86 1.07
Negative Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male a = 1.79 1.80
SD = .58 .64
Female 1.74 2.04
.90 1.06
* Low values indicate perceptions of independence
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations of Decision Consequences X
Group Gender X Focal Person Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Trust*
Positive Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male
Female
II = 2.53
SD = 1.04
2.71
1.07
2.51
.90
3.00
1.05
Negative Consequences for Focal Person
Group Gender
Male
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
U = 2.47
SD = 1.0 4
2.60
.90
Female 2.57
1.15
3.11
1.32
* Low values indicate perceptions of trust
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Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations of Decision Consequences X
Group Gender X Focal Person Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Objectivity*
Positive Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male
Female
M = 2.53
SD = 1.05
3.16
1.22
2.85
2.77
1.20
Negative Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male
Female
M = 3.03
SD = 1.05
3.53
1.38
3.05
1.26
3.38
1.43
* Low values indicate perceptions of objectivity
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Table 12
Means and Standard Deviations of Decision Consequences X
Group Gender X Focal Person Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Commitment*
Positive Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male a = 1.86 1.77
SD = .85 .65
Female 2.01 2.08
.82 .89
Negative Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male M. = 1.87 1.97
SD = .85 .67
Female 1.83 2.20
.80 .97
* Low values indicate perceptions of commitment
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interaction for the single item Opportunism, £ (1,159) = 6.86, £
< .01, n2 m .35. The means and standard deviations for this
analysis are presented in Table 13. The individual rated the
least opportunistic, (M = 3.20) was a male disagreeing with
men and suffering. The individual rated the most opportunistic
(U = 4.60) , was a female disagreeing with women and
benefiting. These results are consistent with the
benefit/suffer theory in general, but do not support the
specific hypothesis. There is the possibility that this finding
is due to alpha error, especially since the Opportunism variable
consists of only one item and is probably quite unreliable.
There were two significant main effects on the perceived
objectivity measure. Those who experienced positive
consequences were rated as more objective than those who
experienced negative consequences, £ (1,159) = 5.83, e < .01,
ft2 = .46, and focal persons in the male groups were
perceived as more objective than those in the female groups, £
(1,159) = 4.06, fi < .05, a 2 = .32. Table 14 contains the
means and standard deviations for these analyses.
Observers' Opinions
Consequences of the decision had significant main effects
on observers' opinions, £ (1,159) = 24.56, E < .001, n 2 =
.78. Table 15 contains the means and standard deviations for
this analysis. The observers agreed with the party who enjoyed
the positive consequences and stated the opposite opinion of the
party who experienced the negative consequences. This indicates
that, in this context, observers were affected by the
consequences of the decision on the decision-makers but the
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Table 13
Means and standard Deviations of Decision Consequences X
Group Gender X Focal Person Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Opportunism*
Positive Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male
Female
H = 3.75
SD = 1.59
3.35
1.31
4.55
2.14
4.60
1.39
Negative Consequences for Focal Person
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male
Female
a = 3.20
SD = 1.28
4.20
1.70
4.45
1.76
3.25
1.44
* High values indicate perceptions of opportunity
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Table 14
Means and Standard Deviations of
Decision Consequences and Group Gender Main Effects
Dependent Measure: Objectivity
Objectivity*
Decision Consequences M. SD
for Focal Person
Group Gender
Positive 2.83 1.10
Negative 3.28 1.28
Objectivity*
& SD
Male 2.87 1.05
Female 3.25 1.19
Low values indicate perceptions of objectivity
Table 15
Main Effects of Decision Consequences
on Subjects' Opinions*
Subjects' Opinions
Decision Consequences M SD
for Focal Person
Positive 2.44 .78
Negative 1.77 .91
* High values indicate agreement with focal person
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influence was in the direction opposite to that found by earlier
research.
Subjects' opinions on the issue were significantly
correlated with their attributions for the focal person's
opinion (i = .27, e < -01) • When subjects made internal
attributions for the focal person's opinion, they tended to
agree with the focal person's opinion, but when subjects made
external attributions for the focal person's opinion, they
tended to disagree with the focal person. Table 16 contains the
correlations between subjects' opinions on the issue and the
perception variables. As with attributions, all of the
correlations were significant in the predicted direction.
As discussed above, the effects would demonstrated by a
three-way interaction between focal person gender, group gender,
and opinion consequences. The effect was not found with the
previous measures, nor was it found with the measure of
observers' opinions. The three-way interaction term was not
significant, £ (1,155) = 1.48, e > -lOr failing to support the
hypothesis. Table 17 contains the means and standard deviations
for these hypotheses.
A significant two-way interaction was found between focal
person gender and group gender, Z (1,155) = 4.63, E < -05,
n2 = .15. When focal persons differed with members of their
own gender, subjects were more likely to agree with their
position. When they differed with members of the opposite
gender, observers tended to disagree with them. Table 18
contains the means and standard deviations for these conditions.
There appears to be a contrast effect between focal person and
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Table 16
Correlations between
Subjects' Opinions1 and Perception Measures
Measures
Honesty .25***
Bias .30***
Independence .12*
Trust .28***
Objectivity .39***
Commitment .17**
Opportunism .20**
1 High = 'Hire from Outside', Low = 'Promote from Within'
* B < .05
** E < .01
*** B < .001
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Table 17
Means and Standard Deviations of Decision Consequences X
Group Gender X Focal Person Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Subjects' Opinions*
Positive Consequences for Focal Person
Group Gender
Male
Female
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
XL = 2.45
SD = .76
2.40
.82
2.35
.88
2.55
.69
Negative Consequences for Focal Person
Group Gender
Male
Female
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
a = 1.95
SD = 1.00
1.45
.69
1.65
.88
2.05
1.00
High values indicate agreement with focal person
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Table 18
Means and Standard Deviations of
Focal Person Gender X Group Gender Interaction
Dependent Measure: Subjects' Opinions*
Focal Person Gender
Male Female
Group Gender
Male fl = 2.20 2.00
SD = 1.45 1.94
Female 1.92 2.30
1.55 1.16
High ratings indicate agreement with focal person
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group gender that leads observers to disagree with the focal
person when he/she is the sole representative of his/her gender.
This was predicted only for the condition in which a woman
disagrees with men.
Regression Analysis
The second Hypothesis predicted that, due to the gender of
the actors and subjects' reactions to the decision consequences,
observers' attributions and perceptions would have a mediating
influence on subjects' opinions on the issue discussed by the
decision-makers. The probable existence of the proposed causal
chain can be assessed by a multiple hierarchical regression
analysis. If attributions and perceptions do indeed mediate the
relationship between decision consequences and observers'
opinions, then entering them into a regression equation
predicting opinions from decision consequences alone would
result in a significant increase in j$2 . This would
indicate that the predicted mediator shares variance with
observers' opinions. However, it does not necessarily follow
that the predicted mediator shares the same variance as decision
consequences, which must be the case in order to find support
for a mediating effect. In order to test whether the two
predictors share the same variance with the criterion variable,
the attribution or perception variables are entered on the first
step of the regression and the decision consequences variable is
entered on the second step. If there is no significant increase
in £2 after decision consequences is added, this indicates
that it is not accounting for any additional variance of
subjects' opinions. The variance of decision consequences is
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completely shared with the variance of the proposed mediating
variable. This can be interpreted as support for an influence
of attributions or perceptions on the relationship between
decision consequences and subjects' opinions.
If the mediating effect of attributions and perceptions is
not present, the pattern of results described above should not
occur. That is, attributions and perceptions may not improve
prediction of subjects' opinions over that of decision
consequences alone. This would indicate that they are not
accounting for any additional variance of subjects' opinions.
Even if they do improve the prediction of subjects' opinions,
decision consequences should not improve the ability of
attributions or perceptions in predicting opinions. This would
indicate that that the variables are accounting for unique
variance and the mediating effect would not be present.
The results of these regression analyses did not support
the existence of the proposed causal chain. As shown in Table
19, in almost all cases, adding the proposed mediating
attribution and perception variables to the equation predicting
subjects' opinions from the decision consequences
(benefit/suffer) resulted in a significant increase in £2.
However when the order was reversed, the addition of decision
consequences to the equations between these variables and
subjects' opinions consistently led to a larger increase in
Sr , indicating that correctness accounted for more unique
variance than the perception variables. These results are
contained in Table 20. Observers who had positive perceptions
of the communicator tended to agree with his/her opinion but
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Table 19
Increase in £2 Wnen Each Attribution and
Perception Variable Was Added to
Decision Consequences—Subjects' Opinions Equation
Original New
Measures £2 %2 jf F
Attribution
.13 .22 1,157 16.53***
Honesty
.13 .19 1,157 10.12**
Bias
.13 .22 1,157 16.88***
Independence
.13 .15 1,157 2.93
Trust
.13 .22 1,157 16.16***
Objectivity
.13 .24 1,157 22.21***
Commitment
.13 .16 1,157 5.01*
Opportunism
.13 .19 1,157 28.67***
* £ < .01
** s < -001
*** S < .0001
Table 20
Increase in £2 when Decision Consequences
Was Added to Each
Attribution or Perception—Subjects' Opinions Equation
Original New
Measures £2 jj2 df
Attribution .07 .22 1,157 28.49*
Honesty
Bias
Independence
Trust
Objectivity
Commitment
Opportunism
* £ < .0001
.06 .19 1,157 24.05*
.09 .22 1,157 25.91*
.02 .15 1,157 28.84*
.08 .22 1,157 26.75*
.15 .24 1,157 18.33*
.03 .16 1,157 24.54*
.04 .19 1,157 28.67*
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these perceptions did not mediate the relationship between
decision consequences and opinions.
The Influence of Perceived Correctness
It is evident from the correlational data that the only
concrete effects of the decision consequences was on their
perceptions of the correctness and incorrectness of the decision
reached by the group and the focal person. That is, the
relationship between decision consequences and the dependent
variables was largely determined by observers' perceptions of
correctness/incorrectness. When the focal person (or the group)
outlined a decision and the supervisor complimented its
creativity (benefited) , subjects apparently interpreted the
compliment as evidence that the decision was correct.
Conversely, when the abilities of the focal person (or the
group) were questioned by their manager, subjects interpreted
this as evidence that the decision was incorrect.
In order to further investigate the influence of the
perceived correctness of the arguments, multiple hierarchical
regression analyses were conducted. Employing the attribution
and perception variables as dependent measures, the decision
consequences variable was entered into regression equations on
the first step and the correctness measure was entered on the
second step. The results were analyzed following the same logic
as the previous analyses. If perceptions of correctness do
mediate the relationship between decision consequences and
subjects' attributions and perceptions, entering the correctness
measure on the second step would result in a significant
increase in s,2 . Conversely, there should not be a
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significant increase if the variables are entered in the reverse
order.
Attribution. A significant mediating relationship was
found between observers' perceptions of correctness and
observers' attributions. When the correct/ incorrect measure was
added to the equation predicting attributions from the decision
consequences manipulation, the increase in £2 f rom .QO to
.09 was significant, £(1,155) = 15.64, e < .0001. When these
variables were entered in the opposite order however, the change
in £2 (from .07 to .09) was not significant. These
results are consistent with the interpretation that the effects
of the decision consequences manipulations are operating on
attributions through their effects on correctness perceptions.
Since significant effects were found, it was necessary to
cross-validate the measure. Multiple regression procedures take
advantage of chance error of measurement for any given sample,
which results in an £2 that is valid for that sample but
is misleading when the predictors are applied to a new sample.
The result is that when the beta weights that were derived from
the first sample are applied to a second sample, they will have
lower predictive power, resulting in shrinkage of £2.
Cross-validation procedures can test for this effect by applying
the beta weights from one half the sample to predict the
responses for the other half of the sample. These predicted
responses are then correlated with their actual responses and
the resulting £ is squared. This new £2 should be lower
than the original £2 but a substantial reduction indicates
that shrinkage has taken place.
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Attempts to cross-validate the attribution measure were not
successful. The £2 computed from the data of one half of
the sample was reduced from .23 to .03 when the beta weights
were used to predict responses for the second half. Thus, the
evidence in support of the notion that subjects' perceptions of
correctness mediated the relationship between decision
consequences and their attributions was not validated.
Perceptions of the Focal Person. Table 21 contains the
results of adding the correctness measure to the regression
equation between the decision consequences variable and each of
the perception variables. All of the increases in £2 were
significant (£' s < .0001) while, as shown in Table 22,
£2 was significantly increased for only two of the
variables by adding decision consequences to the equation
predicting the perception variables from the correctness
measure, (Trust and Opportunism, £' s < .05). Typically,
adding correctness to the equation increased the amount of
variance accounted for from 0% to 7-17%. As shown in Table 23,
however, attempts to cross-validate the results were mixed. The
initial £2 computed from the data of one half the sample
increased for some of the variables and decreased for others
when their beta weights were applied to the second half. Except
for the original Knight and Weiss (1980) measure of Honesty and
the Trust measure developed in the current study, little or no
evidence was found from which to conclude that subjects'
perceptions of correctness influenced their perceptions of the
actors. Even for Honesty and Trust, £2 shrank
dramatically.
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Table 21
Increase in £2 when Correctness Measure
Was Added to Each
Decision Consequences—Attribution or Perception Equation
Original New
Measures £2 £2 ^f
Attribution
Honesty
Bias
Independence
Trust
Objectivity
Commitment
Opportunism
* E < .01
** E < -001
*** E < .0001
00 .09 1,157 15.64***
00 .16 1,157 29.30***
00 .17 1,157 31.71***
00 .05 1,157 8.94*
00 .20 1,157 39.43***
04 .20 1,157 32.35***
00 .09 1,157 15.96***
01 .07 1,157 9.93**
Table 22
Increase in £2 When Decision Consequences
Was Added to Each
Correctness—Attribution or Perception Equation
Original New
Measures £2 ^2 af
Attribution .07 .09 1,157 3.21
Honesty
Bias
Independence
Trust
Objectivity
Commitment
Opportunism
* E < .05
.15 .16 1,157 1.16
.16 .17 1,157 2.40
.05 .05 1,157 1.14
.17 .20 1,157 4.20
.19 .20 1,157 .40
.08 .09 1,157 1.08
.04 .07 1,157 4.37
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Table 23
Change in £2 when Each
Correctness Regression Cross-Validated
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Measures
Original New
£ z £ 2 df
Attribution .23 .03 1,77
Honesty
Bias
Independence
Trust
Objectivity
Commitment
Opportunism
30 .10 1,77
34 .05 1,77
17 .01 1,77
29 .10 1,77
06 .34 1,77
27 .03 1,77
04 .05 1,77
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Opinions. As with the previous variables, the addition of
the correct/incorrect measure to the equation predicting
subjects' opinions from the consequences of the decision
resulted in a significant increase in £2 f r0m .13 to .70,
£ (1,155) = 296.13, e < .00001. When the variables were entered
in the opposite order, there was a significant increase in
£2 » £ (1,155) = 5.25, e < .05, but the change in
£2 (from .69 to .70) was not nearly as great. Thus, the
results are consistent with the notion that subjects'
perceptions of the correctness of the arguments played a strong
mediating role between the decision consequences and their
opinions on the issue. This effect was demonstrated to remain
strong after cross-validation. The £2 computed from the
data for one half of the sample shrank only slightly (from .67
to .63) when their beta weights were applied to the other half
of the sample.
Discussion
Previous research has shown that when an individual
suffered as a result of stating an opinion, he was admired by
observers. The observers made internal attributions for his
opinions and they perceived him as being more honest,
independent, and unbiased. When the actor benefited as the
result of stating an opinion, observers made external
attributions and perceived him as being less honest and
independent, and more biased (Knight & Weiss, 1980) . The same
results were expected in this study, but due apparently to the
influence of correctness perceptions, this was not found. The
expected mediating effects of subjects' attributions and
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perceptions on the relationship between decision consequences
and subjects' opinions were not found, either. Instead, a
strong mediating effect for the correctness of the decision on
the relationship between the decision consequences and subjects'
opinions was found. Correctness did not appear to mediate the
relationship between decision consequences and subjects'
attributions and perceptions.
Extensive pilot testing had been performed in an attempt to
remove the confounding effects of correctness perceptions.
While pilot subjects had perceived the correctness of the
decision to be independent of the consequences of the decision
manipulation, this was not found in the current study. Instead,
decision consequences and perceptions of correctness were highly
correlated. When the decision-makers experienced positive
consequences, subjects viewed this as evidence that they had
made the correct decision. When the decision-makers experienced
negative consequences, subjects viewed this as evidence that
they had made the incorrect decision. Thus, manipulating the
decision consequences conditions served to manipulate subjects'
perceptions of the correctness of the decision. Regression
analyses revealed that observers' perceptions of correctness
outweighed the influence of group gender or dissenter gender
when subjects formed their own opinions concerning the correct
solution.
The predicted effects of the gender of the actors and the
sex-role of the situation did not materialize. Neither of these
variables appeared to have had a significant effect on any of
the perceptions or attributions made by observers.
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Optimistically, one could conclude that the sex-role of the
situation and the gender of those involved were not issues on
which subjects chose to base their opinion; the actual quality
of the decision was of more importance. These would certainly
be welcome findings, and somewhat different from those found in
the past.
One reason for the failure to support the hypotheses may
have been the overall social context in which the people
described in the study interacted. In the Knight and Weiss
(1980) study, the individual who experienced positive or
negative consequences was a member of the government of a
newly-emerging African nation. His opinion was one of support
for his new government. In the negative consequence condition,
he experienced the breakdown of friendships, verbal threats
against his family, demonstrators throwing rocks through his
windows, and a son who was permanently disabled by
demonstrators. In the positive consequence condition he
received a desirable government appointment, new business
opportunities, an improved standard of living, and a new home.
In contrast, the positive consequence condition for the current
study consisted of the dissenter's boss reading over the
decision, complimenting the dissenter on his/her creativity,
suggesting that he/she is a good candidate for management
training, and questioning whether the other group members have
the same skills. In the negative consequence condition, the
reverse took place. The boss complimented the group on their
creativity, suggested that they may be ready for management
training, and questioned whether the dissenter was ready. Thus,
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the decision consequences manipulations in the two studies were
very different.
In the Knight and Weiss (1980) study the position the
individual took was on a large moral and ethical scale affecting
every aspect of his life, as well as the lives of his family
members. In the current study the issue is relatively narrowly
defined. It is simply a matter of developing a policy about how
to replace a person on the job. Therefore it can be argued that
the moral or ethical issue of suffering (or benefiting) for
sticking to one's opinion becomes less important. Whereas the
individual in the first study (Knight & Weiss, 1980) might even
be viewed as a martyr when considering the pain and suffering he
and his family experienced, it is more difficult to argue that
someone is a martyr because they may not receive management
training.
The fact that the current study described a business
setting may shed further light on the issue of observers viewing
positive decision consequences as evidence of "correctness."
Businesses must make a profit if they are to continue to exist.
It is therefore important for everyone who works for a business,
especially those holding management positions, to maximize the
probability that the company will make a profit. Given that
this was the social environment in which the people in the
scenario were operating, it may therefore be that making the
correct decision became the overriding concern. The only
external evidence that observers had concerning the correctness
of the decision was that the boss, the authority figure, liked
it. Since making the correct decision may be an important
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concern in a business situation, the issue of whether the
dissenter experienced positive or negative consequences as a
result of taking a stand lost salience and observers attended to
the clues that indicated correctness.
In fact, the scenarios were written in such a manner as to
increase the salience of the importance of making the correct
and most profitable decision. As they began the meeting, one of
the participants stated, "It's complicated by the fact that
we're in a tight financial situation at the moment. Bob has
already emphasized the fact that making the wrong decision could
cost us more money than we can afford to lose." This statement
was originally included in the scenario to help balance
subjects' reactions to the two policy positions. Pilot subjects
had a tendency to favor the argument to "promote from within"
out of an expressed feeling of loyalty to the company's workers.
The statement about tight finances added weight to the argument
of hiring "an experienced supervisor" from outside the
organization and thus helped in balancing subjects' opinions
about the two arguments. Unfortunately, the issue of fairness
may have been replaced by the issue of correctness. Subjects
may have felt there was a need to identify the correct solution
to the problem in order to insure the viability of the company.
Thus, the salience of the experimental manipulations would have
been significantly diminished except as evidence to help
identify the correct decision.
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Study II
Based on the line of thought outlined above, a second
study was conducted. All of the stimulus materials were
identical to those in Study I except in one respect: The
organization that employed the group members was changed from a
for-profit enterprise to a non-profit enterprise. Applied
Technologies became Food for the Children, and the
decision-makers discussed whether they should promote one of
their local volunteers to a paid position as a regional director
or hire an experienced director from outside the organization
(see Appendix G)
.
It was hypothesized that, given a non-profit
organizational setting, observers would not feel that making the
most profitable decision was as important as in Study I.
Therefore the moral issues of sticking to ones decision against
all odds or making a decision "because that's what the boss
wants to hear" would increase in salience. Subjects would
therefore attend to positive and negative consequences of the
decision as previously hypothesized.
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 33 undergraduate students enrolled at Kansas
State University; 17 (52%) were female and 16 (48%) were male.
They received credit toward fulfilling general psychology
requirements for their participation.
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Task
Subjects read a transcript of a small group in a non-profit
organization engaged in a decision-making task followed by a
short description of the consequences of their decision (see
Appendix G) . The issue in question was whether to replace a
retiring paid director by hiring a person from outside the
organization or by promoting a volunteer from within the
organization. As in Study I, the decision-making group
consisted of four persons. When they reached a final decision,
three of the group were in agreement and one individual arrived
at a decision different from the rest of the group. When the
final decision was presented to their supervisor, the focal
person's opinion was printed with the group's decision as a
minority position.
Manipulations
Decision Consequences. The consequences of the decisions
were manipulated for both the individual who reached an
independent decision and for the group members who were in
agreement. In the positive consequence (benefit) condition for
the focal person, the supervisor read the two decisions,
complimented the focal person on his/her creativity, suggested
that the focal person had management potential, and questioned
whether the other group members had management potential. In
the negative consequence (suffer) condition for the focal
person, the supervisor complimented the group members on their
creativity, suggested that they had management potential, and
questioned whether the focal person had management potential.
There was no manipulation of argument condition in Study
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II, since there were no significant differences between the two
conditions in Study I. The focal person argued that the
organization should promote one of their volunteers. There were
no manipulations of focal person or group gender since the
hypothesis was not directly concerned with these variables. All
decision-makers in the scenario were male.
Dependent Variables
Attributions. As in Study I, subjects indicated on
seven-point Likert scales the extent to which they attributed
the focal person's opinion to dispositional causes (the focal
person's concern for the volunteers and the organization) or to
situational causes (the potential to benefit personally by
making the "right" decision). After removing two distractor
items, the scales to three of the remaining items were reversed
and the six items were averaged to form the dispositional vs.
situational index of attribution. A reliability analysis of
this measure resulted in a coefficient alpha of .86.
Perceptions of the Focal Person. The three perception
scales (Honesty, Independence, and Bias) identified by Knight
and Weiss (1980) and the four scales identified in Study I
(Nonopportunistic, Trustworthy, Objective, and Independent) were
again used for Study II. The reliability coefficients for these
measures are presented in Table 24.
Opinions. The same opinion measure used in Study I was
again used in Study II.
Correct/Incorrect. The scales for two of the responses to
the questions "was the individual/group correct?" and "Was the
individual/group incorrect" were reversed, and the four items
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Table 24
Study II
Reliability of Perceptions of the Focal Person Measures
Measures Alpha
Original Measures (Knight & Weiss, 1980)
Honesty
.81
(honest, sincere, trustworthy, & principled)
Bias
.84
(biased, manipulative, selfish, & opportunistic)
Independence
.65
(independent, committed, unafraid, & consistent)
New Measures
Trust
.82
(sincere, likeable, trustworthy,
nonmanipulative, & selfless)
Objectivity
.62
(unbiased, openminded, and intelligent)
Commitment
.74
(honest, principled, independent, committed,
unafraid, & consistent)
Opportunism *
(opportunistic)
The measure Opportunistism consisted of only one item
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were averaged to form a measure of perceived correctness/
incorrectness of the decision. A reliability analysis of this
measure resulted in a coefficient alpha of .74.
Analyses
Student's £ tests were employed in order to investigate the
effects of decision consequences on subjects' attributions,
perceptions, opinions, and perceptions of correctness. The
decision consequences manipulation served as the single
independent variable. In order to investigate the possible
mediating effects of subjects' attributions and perceptions,
hierarchical regression analyses were employed. Each of these
measures was added separately to the regression equation
predicting subjects' opinions from the decision consequences
manipulation. Hierarchical regression analyses were also
employed in order to investigate the possible mediating effects
of subjects' perceptions of the correctness of the decisions.
For each of the dependent measures, the correct/incorrect
measure was added to the regression equation containing the
decision consequences manipulation.
Results
Manipulation Checks
In order to investigate whether observers' perceptions of
correctness were still affected by the decision consequences
manipulations in Study II, a ± test was performed between the
positive and negative consequences groups using perceptions of
correctness as the dependent measure. The difference between
the two groups was significant (i (31) = 3.44, p. < .01).
However, in this study, the relationship was in the opposite
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direction to that in Study I. Actors who were perceived as
experiencing positive consequences were rated as having made the
incorrect decision (U = 1.34, SD = .40), while actors who were
perceived as experiencing negative consequences were rated as
having made the correct decision (M = 1.79, SD = .33). The
correlation between decision consequences and perceived
correctness in Study I was x = -.23, e < .01, whereas the
correlation between the same variables in Study II was i = .70,
E < .001. The implications of this reversal in subjects'
perceptions will be discussed below.
Attributions
It was predicted that subjects would attribute to internal
causes the opinions of a focal person who experienced negative
consequences, and to external causes the opinions of a focal
person who experienced positive consequences. A i test
indicated that there was no significant difference between the
positive (U = 2.74, SD = 1.48) and the negative (M = 2.78,
SD = .61) conditions.
Regression analysis did not reveal effects of perceptions
of correctness on attributions. The change in £2 when
correct/incorrect was added to the decision
consequences—attribution equation was nonsignificant, £ (1,31)
=
.27, £ > .10). Thus, neither decision consequences nor
correctness were major influences on subjects' attributions for
the actors' opinions.
Perceptions of the Focal Person
It was predicted that actors who experienced negative
consequences would be perceived more positively than actors who
68
experienced positive consequences. No support was found for
this prediction, however. T. tests revealed no significant
differences in perceptions between the two conditions for any of
the perception variables. Table 25 contains the means and
standard deviations for these analyses.
Adding the correctness measure to each decision
consequence
—
perception regression equation a revealed very weak
mediating influence similar to that found in Study I but in the
opposite direction. Table 26 contains the results of the forced
hierarchical regressions. For the three items Honesty, Bias,
and Trust, the change in £2 with the addition of the
correctness measure was significant (e 1 s < .05). As shown
in Table 27, when correct/incorrect was entered into the
regression on the first step, the addition of the decision
consequences variable on the second step did not significantly
increase £2 for any of the perception variables {£' s >
.10) . However, as shown in Table 28, an attempt to
cross-validate the results was not successful. The J52 of
approximately .30 calculated from the data of one half of the
sample dropped to approximately .04 when their beta weights were
applied to the other half of the sample.
The changes for the other items were of comparable
magnitude to those in the Study I, but the smaller sample
lowered the power for testing the effects, resulting in the
marginally significant results. Correctness may have served as
a weak mediating variable for some perceptions, but in this case
decision-makers suffering negative consequences as a result of
their decision were viewed more positively, while those
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Table 25
Study II
Means and Standard Deviations of X tests
Between Decision Consequences Conditions
Dependent Variables: Attribution
and Perception Measures*
Decision Consequences
for Focal Person
Measures
Attribution**
Honesty
Bias
Independence
Trust
Objectivity
Commitment
Opportunism
Positive Negative
H = 2.74
SD = 1.48
2.77
.61
2.34
1.19
2.18
1.10
2.73
1.07
2.52
1.05
1.72
.72
1.74
.80
3.04
1.14
2.69
1.22
3.21
1.33
2.47
1.17
1.86
.75
1.86
.85
3.25
1.95
4.41
2.18
* Low values indicate positive perceptions, high values
indicate negative perceptions
** Low values indicate dispositional attributions,
high values indicate situational attributions
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Table 26
Study II
Increase in £2 when Correctness Measure
Was Added to Each
Decision Consequences—Attribution or Perception Equation
Measures
Original
E2
New
£2 df F
Attribution .00 .01 1,28 .27
Honesty .01 .13 1,28 4.23*
Bias .01 .14 1,28 4.62*
Independence .00 .01 1,28 .32
Objectivity .08 .18 1,28 3.35
Trust .02 .19 1,28 6.06**
Commitment .00 .07 1,28 2.26
Opportunism .07 .10 1,28 .83
* E < -05
** E < .01
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Table 27
Study II
Increase in £2 when Decision Consequences
Was Added to Each
Correctness—Attribution or Perception Equation
Measures
Original
£2
New
£2 df F
Attribution .00 .01 1,28 .12
Honesty .11 .13 1,28 .50
Bias .13 .14 1,28 .38
Independence .01 .01 1,28 .12
Objectivity .17 .18 1,28 .28
Trust .18 .19 1,28 .28
Commitment .05 .07 1,28 .62
Opportunism .00 .10 1,28 3.40
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Table 28
Study II
Change in £2 when Each
Correctness Regression Cross-Validated
Measures
Original New
E2 B2 df
Honesty
Bias
Independence
Trust
Objectivity
Commitment
Opportunism
.34 .00 1,77
.61 .02 1,77
.27 .07 1,77
.36 .08 1,77
.65 .04 1,77
.41 .04 1,77
.12 .13 1,77
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experiencing positive consequences were viewed more negatively.
Opinions
It was predicted that observers would be most influenced by
the focal person who experienced negative consequences as a
result of maintaining his opinion. Consequences of the decision
did have a marginal effect on the subjects' opinions (i (31) =
1.79, 2. < .10). Subjects tended to agree with actors who
experienced negative consequences (H = 1.82, SD = .88) and
disagree with actors who experienced positive consequences (M
= 2.38, SD = .89). Subjects' perceptions of the correctness of
the decision had a much larger effect, however. The increase in
£2 (from .09 to .75) when correct/incorrect was added to
the decision consequences—subjects' opinions equation was
significant, £ (1,29) = 80.76, p. < .0001, while entering the
variables in the reverse order did not lead to a significant
change, £ (1,29) = 3.28, p. < .10. These effects were
successfully cross-validated. The £2 f .81 calculated
from the data of one half of the subjects only dropped to .71
when applied to the other half. Those who rated the focal
person as having been correct said they would have made the same
decision (hire from outside) , and those who rated him as
incorrect said they would have made the opposite decision
(promote from within) . Since decision consequences and
correct/incorrect were highly correlated (r = .72) it can be
argued that actors who experienced negative consequences were
generally viewed as being correct and that subjects tended to
agree with them. Conversely, actors who experienced positive
consequences were viewed as incorrect and subjects tended to
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disagree with them.
Discussion— Study II
Study II was conducted in an attempt to free the decision
consequences manipulation from the confounding effects of
observers' perceptions of the correctness or incorrectness of
the actors' decisions. This was done by changing the social
setting of the decision-making situation from that of a
for-profit business to a non-profit volunteer organization. The
effects of this change on subjects' perceptions were dramatic.
There was a complete reversal in subjects' reactions to the
consequences of the decision. In Study I (a business meeting)
,
when the target person stuck to his/her opinion and was
questioned by the boss as a result, subjects viewed this as
evidence that the individual had made the incorrect decision.
In Study II (a non-profit organization meeting) , when the target
person stuck to his opinion and was questioned by the boss as a
result, subjects viewed this as evidence that the individual had
made the correct decision. The only aspect that differed
between the two studies was the type of organization in which
the actors were interacting. In the case where maintaining an
opinion and experiencing positive consequences was perceived as
evidence of a correct decision, the organization was a private
company which, one could argue, is primarily concerned with
making a profit. In the case where maintaining an opinion and
experiencing positive consequences was perceived as evidence of
an incorrect decision, the organization was a volunteer
organization primarily concerned with altruistic and charitable
activities.
75
General Discussion
Previous research findings (Knight & Weiss, 1980)
demonstrated that when a person suffered as a result of
maintaining an opinion in spite of adverse reactions, he was
positively perceived by observers and they were influenced by
his opinions on the issue. When he benefited he was negatively
perceived by observers and he had less influence on their
opinions. The results of Study II parallel these findings but
the results of Study I are quite different. In the Knight and
Weiss (1980) study, the person held a governmental position in
an emerging African nation and his opinion was one of support
for the new government. In Study II the person was a member of
a non-profit organization and his opinion concerned the best
method of replacing a local director. Study I revolved around a
business manager whose decision concerned the best method of
replacing a first line supervisor. The most salient difference
between the first two situations and the latter situation would
appear to be one of profit. It can be argued that the
independent individual was admired and respected for his opinion
and his experiencing negative consequences as long as the
situation concerned the primarily moral and ethical
considerations of independent self-government or the feeding of
starving children.
When the profit motive was introduced to the scenario, the
emphasis shifted entirely. Observers were no longer concerned
with the higher moral considerations of maintaining one'
s
opinion in the face of adversity. Instead, their focus shifted
to effectiveness. What decision will be most economically
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beneficial for the company? What decision is the correct
decision? The only evidence of correctness available to
subjects (other than their own biases) was the boss's approval
of the "creativity" of one decision and his subsequent
suggestion that the author(s) would make "(a) good candidate(s)
for executive training." They focused on this information in
order to decide which of the two opinions was correct. Then,
once they had decided that one was correct and the other was
incorrect, this perception of correctness had a major influence
on their subsequent opinions.
Since this study utilized college undergraduates as
subjects, there could be other interpretations of the results.
One could argue that the reason subjects were so influenced by
the opinion of the boss was because they felt unfamiliar with
the management setting as it was described in the scenario.
Being on unfamiliar ground, they looked for evidence from the
relative "experts" in the scenario to help them form opinions.
The actor in the scenario with the most prestige and influence
was the boss, so it follows that subjects would be most
influenced by his opinions.
When the non-profit scenario was presented to subjects, it
could be further argued that this was a situation with which
they felt more familiar. Many subjects may have had experience
volunteering for a non-profit organization and therefore felt
they had more expertise in dealing with the issue at hand. So
much so, in fact, that they felt they could disagree with the
national director in the matter of how to fill the position of a
paid local director. They did so, and generally agreed with the
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person who was not complimented by the director after stating
his decision.
This would also be in line with Knight and Weiss' (1980)
findings. The original study had involved a political decision.
It can be argued that most people feel that, they are "expert"
enough to make decisions concerning politics. So in both the
political and the non-profit situations, subjects based their
opinions on their own reactions to the issue but in the
management situation, they based their opinions on the boss'
reaction to the issue.
It can also be argued that college undergraduates have had
as much, if not more experience working for profit-making
organizations as non-profit organizations. Most students have
held part-time or summer jobs by the time they enter college.
Therefore they should feel just as comfortable with either
situation and base their opinions on their own reactions to the
issue. If this is the case, then the argument that they were
reacting to the necessity of making a profit in Study I takes
precedence.
The Attributions/Perceptions->Qpinions Causal Chain
A major prediction in this study was that observers'
attributions for the actor's opinions and their perceptions of
the actor would have a mediating effect between the consequences
of the decision for the actor and their own opinions about the
issue under discussion. If observers made internal attributions
for the actor's opinions and perceived the actor in a positive
light, then the actor would have more influence on their
opinions. If observers made external attributions for the
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actor's opinions and perceived the actor in a negative light,
then the actor would have less influence on their opinions. In
fact, this is what Knight and Weiss (1980) found in their
research. The results of the current study are not as positive.
In both Studies I and II, there was no support for the notion
that attributions mediate the relationship between decision
consequences and subjects' opinions on the issue.
The evidence that the perceptions that subjects have of an
actor have a mediating influence on their opinions was not much
stronger. In Study I, when the perception measures were added
to the decision consequences—subjects' opinions equation, there
were some significant increases in the ability to predict
subjects' opinions but these effects were countered by more
highly significant increases when the variables were entered in
the reverse order. In Study II, t-tests revealed no significant
effect of the decision consequences on any of the perception
measures. Thus, there is little evidence to suggest that
subjects' perceptions of the actor have a mediating effect on
their opinions.
One reason for this lack of findings is apparently due to
the failure of pilot testing. A series of pilot tests were run
in order to remove any confounding effects caused by subjects'
perceptions that one of the decisions reached was more correct
the other decision. After extensive revisions, when asked which
decision was correct, pilot subjects responded equally to either
side no matter who received positive or negative consequences.
Test subjects did not however. There was a significant bias in
favor of the individuals who experienced positive consequences.
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This difference between pilot and test subject responses may be
due to a Type I error. The sample size for the final
pilot test was 24 subjects whereas Study I utilized a total of
160 subjects. However, some of the means for the pilot sample
were not in the direction that would a indicate preference for
the person who experienced positive consequences, so the issue
did not seem to be a problem at the time.
Another possible cause for the discrepant responses between
pilot and test subjects could be due to the differences in
subject populations. Pilot subjects were run during summer
semester, while test subjects were run during the first half of
fall semester. Summer students tend to atypical of the student
population, made up of more adult students and people filling
out needed credits in their curriculum. The students who sign
up as experimental subjects at the beginning of fall semester
tend to be highly motivated. One cannot conclude that these
differences between the two samples led to the differences found
in their responses, but it is a possible inference.
Gender and Sex Role
It was predicted that the interaction of the gender of the
decision-makers and the consequences of their decisions would
have a moderating effect on subjects' attributions, their
perceptions of the actors, and their opinions on the issue that
the actors discussed. These predictions were based on an
extensive review of research literature in which findings of a
similar nature have long been reported. However, analyses of
variance did not reveal any of the predicted effects. One
reason for this lack of findings may be due to the fact that the
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gender of the individuals involved was not salient to subjects.
This is unlikely however, since the names of the actors were
clearly printed in the left-hand margin of the transcript every
time they spoke (See Appendix A) . This was the same method used
to manipulate gender in many of the previously-cited
experiments.
That subjects ignored gender could also be due to the fact
that the issue of gender was not a factor upon which subjects
based their decisions. When asked to evaluate the
decision-makers and their decisions, subjects based their
responses on the issues that were under discussion rather than
the gender of the discussants. This would certainly be a
positive conclusion. It would indicate that prejudices and
stereotypes about the correct roles for men and women are not so
strong as to influence the evaluation of decisions made by
others. Since the predictions were based on previous research
however, there is still the question of why there is a
discrepancy between the results found in this study and the
results found in published studies. One reason may be due to
the "file-drawer phenomenon:" only studies that find
significant differences are published; nonsignificant findings
end up hidden in researchers' file-drawers. It may be that the
studies where significant sex differences in attributions and
evaluations are not found do not get published. The result is a
trend in the research literature that indicates strong sex
differences but that is not consistently found by actual
research.
Another possibility for the lack of significant gender
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results may be due to the fact that students may respond
differently to the stimuli than actual business managers would.
The expected gender bias may be present in managers but not in
students. Perhaps due to different socialization processes
affecting the different age groups, students do not view gender
as being as important an issue as managers do. This would also
be a positive conclusion, for it would indicate that
socialization processes are changing for the better. Young
people do not hold prejudices and stereotypes about women that
are as negative as their elders. However, most of the previous
research that found gender biases was performed with student
samples. Besides, it is the experimenter's subjective
observation that sex-role stereotypes and prejudices are alive
and well among the undergraduate population on this campus.
There is always the possibility that, since students were
presented with "paper people," they did not react to them in the
same manner in which they would have reacted if the situation
had involved live actors. Since they were asked to rate their
reactions to the actors after reading a transcript of the
situation, it can be argued that it would be easy for them to
maintain high principles on paper and respond in a non-sexist
manner. Knowing their responses were being recorded and
measured by a psychologist, they could respond to the situation
in a manner that was as objective and unbiased as possible. It
does not necessarily follow then, that they would respond in the
same manner to actual interactions between "real" men and women
in the workplace. The potential for "socially correct" response
bias is present in this study.
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External Validity
It is a common criticism in industrial-organizational
psychology that, due to the artificiality imposed on subjects in
the lab, field studies have an inherently higher external
validity than laboratory studies. However, an investigation of
the issue (Dipboye and Flanagan, 1979) has found that field
studies suffer from many of same problems that affect laboratory
research, including an overuse of self-report measures, the
frequent use of satisfaction as the only measure in a study, and
the use of a narrow range of subjects for research. The
investigators concluded that the issue of external validity is
an important issue in all industrial-organizational research,
not just research which takes place in laboratory settings.
The goal of the current study was to demonstrate that
witnessing an individual experience certain consequences as a
result of an opinion and that the context in which this takes
place can have effects on the observer's own opinions on that
issue. Thus, the goal was an attempt to demonstrate that a
phenomenon can happen under certain conditions, rather than
attempting to demonstrate that it wjJJ, happen with specific
populations. This is in line with Mook's (1983) discussion of
research, in which he pointed out that much of laboratory
research is performed not in order to investigate a specific
population, but to investigate a theory. The goal of the study
is not necessarily to predict behavior in real-life settings,
but to predict behavior that can happen. Consequently, it is
not necessary for the subject population to be representative of
a given class of "real-world" people. If the study can
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demonstrate that the subjects react differentially across
conditions, then this may be taken as evidence that the
theoretical construct does exist. This in itself should make
the study worthy of consideration.
Although the predicted results were not significant, there
were two significant findings in this study. The first was the
mediating effect of correctness on the relationship between the
decision consequences and subjects' opinions. This finding is
not particularly dramatic. More than anything else, it
demonstrates the lack of successfully removing the effect of
correctness when pilot testing. The second significant finding
was the reversal of subjects' reactions to the profit and
non-profit organizations. This differential reaction to the two
situations may indicate that subjects are perceiving the
situations as operating under different value systems. The
profit organization has an overriding value system of making the
most profitable decision and the non-profit organization has an
overriding value system of making the right ethical/moral
decision. The subjects therefore change their responses to
react appropriately to the current value system as they perceive
it. This "perceived value system" qualifies as a construct that
makes this laboratory study worthy of consideration.
Future Research
The next step in this line of research would be to take the
materials into a field setting to investigate whether
individuals in organizations respond to the stimuli in the same
manner in which the student subjects did. Presenting the same
materials to members of for-profit and non-profit organizations
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would be a clear test of the replicability of the findings.
If similar results are found in such settings, the future
research in the area of the effects of benefiting and suffering
on observers should take into account these results. The fact
that the type of organization in which the experience takes
place can have such a strong effect on observers' perceptions
shows that the perceptions are heavily influenced by the
situational context of the interaction. One possible line of
research might investigate further the distinctions between the
for-profit and the non-profit organizations that produce such
distinctly different results. Based on research done to date,
it appears that the introduction of the profit motive reverses
observers' perceptions of decision consequence and correctness.
There might be other factors that affect these perceptions, too,
such as the morality or ethics of the decision being made or the
urgency of the need for a decision.
Based on the results of this study, the issue of gender
differences does not seem to have a significant effect on
observers' perceptions. Since previous studies have shown an
effect however, researchers may wish to include gender as a
variable in future studies rather than rejecting the notion on
the basis of one study.
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Appendix A: Target Person Argues 'Hire from Outside' and OBMM 90
Experiences Positive Consequences
Applied Technologies is a small manufacturing firm that produces computer
parts for larger companies. One of their first line supervisors is about to
retire and members of the personnel department have been given the task of
deciding on the best method of finding a replacement
The discussion focuses on whether they should promote one of their
employees from the assembly line or by hire a supervisor from outside the
company. In the end Carl, Ralph, and Kevin reach one conclusion and Mark
arrives at a different solution.
The transcripts are followed by a short guestionnaire concerning the
topic under discussion. Please read the transcripts carefully and fill out
the guestionnaire.
Carl: "Well, we all managed to show up on time. What a switch, huh?"
Ralph: "Yeah, I guess the issue we have to decide on here is how to replace
Harvey Johnston when he retires next January. It's complicated by
the fact that we're in a tight financial situation at the moment.
Bob has already emphasized the fact that making the wrong decision
could cost us more money than we can afford to lose."
Mark: "What options are available to us?"
Ralph: "Well, we have two options, as I see it. One, we can hire someone
from outside Allied to take his place or two, we can promote one of
the workers off the line. Anybody see any other choices?"
Carl: "Yeah, we can demote one of ourselves to do the job and save the
company a lot of money. Any volunteers?"
Mark: "Sure, Carl. I volunteer you. Any other ideas?"
Kevin: "Well, I prefer promoting someone on the line. I don't think someone
brought in from outside the company would know enough about Allied
Tech to take over Harvey's job."
Ralph: "Yeah, that's true. A supervisor who never worked here would know
less about our operations than the employee working under him. We'd
have to take a lot of time to familiarize him with the plant."
Mark: "It would take longer to train a line worker in supervisory skills
than it would to familiarize a new person with the plant. I think
we'd be better off looking for an experienced supervisor from outside
the plant. There are problems with promoting our own people. Our
line workers may not know enough about supervising to take over
Harvey's job. They've been working as line workers for years—they
don't know anything about supervising people. Just because we have
someone who's a good assembler, that isn't necessarily going to make
them a good supervisor. What if we did promote one of them and he
wasn't any good at it? Cne, we lose a good assembler and two, we
have a lousy supervisor. That doesn't make sense. It wouldn't be
fair to the supervisor or the company."
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Carl: "I dunno, Mark. I think we owe it to the workers to promote them.
It's a way to reward than for loyalty to the company. Some of them
have been working here since we started, you know. They've certainly
earned a chance for promotion after that long. Otherwise it's a
dead-end job. Promoting one of them for good work would serve as an
incentive for others to do well if they see someone rewarded for good
work."
Ralph: "Yeah, I'm not sure we want to bring in an outsider to start bossing
the workers. Like you said, Mark, most of these people have been
working on the line for years. It really wouldn't be fair to just
forget them now. Maybe they're expecting a chance to get promoted
here. It certainly seems like a fair reward to make one of our best
workers a supervisor after all these years of loyalty."
Kevin: "Yeah, I like the idea of having an incentive for the workers."
Mark: "But it's a false incentive! The only reason this job is opening up
is because Harvey is retiring. All the workers can't expect to move
into management. Anyway, you guys have to realize, he may not even
want the job. He'd have to start bossing around all those guys
who' re his friends. I mean, those guys go drinking every Friday and
they hang out together. How's he gonna feel if all the sudden he's
bossing his friends? How' re his friends gonna feel? No one' 11 like
it! It'll break up friendships! I think it would create a lot of
friction if we start singling out one employee for promotion over
others."
Carl: "But we should be rewarding good work with promotion!"
Mark: "But don't forget, we're supposed to base our decision on the
economics of the situation. The company can't afford to make the
wrong decison. If we really want to do this right and hire the best
possible person for the job, we need to review as many potential
candidates as possible. The wider range of candidates we have, the
more likely we'll be able to fill the position with the best person
for the job, right? well, the way to do that is to advertise the
position and let people with management experience apply for it. We
shouldn't just restrict ourselves to the population of sixty-two
people we have working on the line. That's not the way to get the
most qualified person."
Kevin: "Picking someone who doesn't know anything about the company won't
necessarily be the most economical decision, especially if we have a
lot of unhappy workers as a result. Besides, you make it sound like
it'd be unfair to someone to promote them for doing a good job! It
seems fair enough to me. what could be wrong with that? If you want
to talk about fairness, how fair is it to bring in an outsider, who
has never even worked for this company, and ask our employees to
start taking orders from him? Now that's not fair! You know, if we
do bring in this person from outside, that means the workers will
know the can never look forward to any promotion, what' 11 that do
for morale?"
Mark: "I really think that if we want to get the best person for the job, we 92
have to open the position up to skilled supervisors outside of Allied
Tech. We can't restrict ourselves to just the limited number of
employees we have available at Allied. I'm not sure we'd find the
best person for the job frcm within the company and I think we'd
create more problems than we'd solve."
Ralph: "Sorry Mark, but I just can't agree with you. In order to be fair to
our employees we should promote one of our best workers off the line.
It'd be much better for morale."
Kevin: "We have to reach a decision. Personally, I agree with Ralph. I
think the employees deserve to be promoted for good work."
Carl: "Me, too."
Ralph: "Well, it looks like we've reached a decision Mark, what do you
think?"
Mark: "You can take that position to Bob if you want, but I can't agree with
it. I guess I'll have to state a minority opinion. I really think
it would be unfair to our employees to single out a worker for
promotion. Besides, we have such a much broader range of talent if
we go outside the company. You make a formal statement and then I'll
add my opinion on afterwards."
The group must give their decision to the company president so they have
it typed up. First the majority opinion is outlined, then the dissenting
opinion follows. Just as they receive the finished copy, the company
president arrives. He takes a minute to read over the two decisions, then he
says,
"I don't know about the group's arguments, but Mark has raised some
issues that I hadn't even thought of before. I really admire the creativity
that went into them. They're obviously the product of an active mind. Of
course, I'll have to think about it sane more before I decide which choice is
the correct decision. This is a very sensitive and complicated issue.
"You know, I was just thinking about who I should send to that island
retreat for executive training. I think that Mark would make a very good
candidate! I really don't know about the rest of you though. I'm not sure
that any of you have shown executive quality yet."
He shakes his head as he leaves the room.
ISFP
'Appendix B: Target Person Argues 'Promote from Within' and
Experiences Negative Consequences
Applied Technologies is a small manufacturing firm that produces computer
parts for larger companies. One of their first line supervisors is about to
retire and members of the personnel department have been given the task of
deciding on the best method of finding a replacement.
The discussion focuses on whether they should promote one of their
employees from the assembly line or by hire a supervisor from outside the
company. In the end Carol, Ruth, and Karen reach one conclusion and Marcia
arrives at a different solution.
The transcripts are followed by a short questionnaire concerning the
topic under discussion. Please read the transcripts carefully and fill out
the questionnaire.
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Carol: "Well, we all managed to show up on time. What a switch, huh?"
Ruth: "Yeah, I guess the issue we have to decide on here is how to replace
Harvey Johnston when he retires next January. It's complicated by
the fact that we're in a tight financial situation at the moment.
Bob has already emphasized the fact that making the wrong decision
could cost us mote money than we can afford to lose.
"
Marcia: "what options are available to us?"
Ruth: "Well, we have two options, as I see it. One, we can hire someone
from outside Allied to take his place or two, we can promote one of
the workers off the line. Anybody see any other choices?"
Carol: "Yeah, we can demote one of ourselves to do the job and save the
company a lot of money. Any volunteers?"
Marcia: "Sure, Carol. I volunteer you. Any other ideas?"
Karen: "Well, I prefer hiring someone from outside the company. I don't
think any of our line workers know enough about supervising to take
over Harvey's job."
Ruth: "Yeah, that's true. Most of the people have been working on the line
for years. They don't know anything about supervising people—how to
get them to do what you want."
Marcia: "Well, wait a minute now. I think it'd be better to promote one of
our own workers to that position. Do you really want to bring in an
outsider to start bossing them around? Like you said, Ruth, most of
those people have been working on the line for years. It wouldn't be
fair to just forget about them now. Maybe they' re expecting a chance
to get promoted here. It certainly seems like a fair reward to make
one of our best workers a supervisor after years of loyalty."
Carol: "I dunno, Marcia. None of those line workers knows a thing about
supervising. I really think we need a professional with management
experience in there. The company can't afford to have the place go
downhill due to poor supervising."
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Ruth: "Yeah, the problem I have with using one of our own workers is the
fact that just because a given worker is an excellent assembler isn 1 t
necessarily going to make him a good supervisor. Look, what if we
put him in as supervisor and it turns out he isn't any good at it?
One, we lose a good assembler, and two, we have a lousy supervisor.
That doesn't make sense. It wouldn't be fair to the worker or the
company.
"
Karen: "Not only that, but he may not want the job. He'd have to suddenly
start bossing all those guys who' re his friends. I mean, those guys
go out drinking every Friday and they hang out together. How's he
gonna feel if all the sudden he's bossing his friends? How' re his
fiiends. gonna feel? No one'll like it! It'll break up friendships!"
Marcia: "you make it sound like it'd be unfair to someone to promote them for
doing a good job! It seems fair enough to me that, after puting in
years of loyal service, our workers could expect to find a
possibility of promotion into management. What could be wrong with
that? If you want to talk about fairness, how fair is it to bring in
an outsider, who has never even worked for this company, and ask our
employees to start taking orders from him? Now that's not fair!"
Carol: "This is more than an issue of fairness, Marcia. We have to do what
will help the company the most. It wouldn't help anybody if we went
out of business."
Marcia: "There's another reason for looking to our own employees for a
supervisor. They all know this company inside and out. If we
brought in someone, we'd have to spend a lot of time just
familiarizing them with all the complexities of this crazy plant of
ours. The workers would know more about operations than their own
supervisor !
"
Karen: "Well, speaking of the time it'd take to train the supervisor, how
about the time it'd take to train one of our line workers in
supervisory skills? I think it'd take longer than familiarizing an
outsider with the plant."
Ruth: "Me too—a iat longer. Don't forget, we're supposed to base our
decision on the economics of the situation. The company can't
afford to make the wrong decison. If we really want to do this right
and hire the best possible person for the job, we need to review as
many potential candidates as possible. The wider range of candidates
we have, the more likely we'll be able to fill the position with the
best person for the job, right? Well, the way to do that is to
advertise the position and let people with management experience
apply for it. We shouldn't just restrict ourselves to the population
of sixty-two people we have working on the line. That's not the way
to get the most qualified person."
Marcia: "Yeah, but I'm not sure we want to bring in an outsider to start
bossing the workers. They should have their own chance to become
supervisors. If we never promote any of them, then we'll create a
two-class system here; the management and the workers. That'll just
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cause friction and hurt the company in the long run."
Ruth: "Sorry Marcia, but I just can't agree with you. In order to make the
best economical decision and get the best person for the job, we need
to open up the position to skilled supervisors outside of Allied
Tech. We can't restrict ourselves to just a few employees."
Karen: "Well, we have to reach a decision. Personally, I agree with Ruth. I
think we'll get the most qualified person outside the plant. This
place just isn't that large and besides, as Bob told us, we can't
afford to make mistakes."
Carol: "Me, too."
Ruth: "well, it looks like we've reached a decision Marcia, what do you
think?"
Marcia: "You can take that position to Bob if you want, but I can't agree with
it. I guess I'll have to state a minority opinion. I really think
it would be bad for the workers and the company not to give them an
opportunity to get promoted into a management position as a reward
for good work."
Ruth: "Okay, Marcia. We' 11 make a formal statement and then you can add
your opinion on at the end."
The group must give their decision to the company president so they have
it typed up. First the majority opinion is outlined, then the dissenting
opinion follows. Just as they receive the finished copy, the company
president arrives. He takes a minute to read over the two decisions, then he
says,
"I don't know about Marcia' s arguments, but the group has raised some
issues that I hadn't even thought of before. I really admire the creativity
that went into them. They' re obviously the product of active minds. Of
course, I'll have to think about it some more before I decide which choice is
the correct decision. This is a very sensitive and complicated issue.
"you know, I was just thinking about who I should send to that island
retreat for executive training. I think that all of you would make very good
candidates! I really don't know about Marcia though. I'm not sure that you
have shown executive quality yet."
He shakes his head as he leaves the room.
Appendix C: Attribution Scale
The following questions are about the individual who disagreed 96
with the rest or the group. HOW IMPORTANT do you think each
of the following factors was in INFLUENCING HER OPINION?
Place a mark (X) at the point along the scale which best
corresponds to your opinion.
1. The individual's concern for finding a quality supervisor.
Extremely
Important
Uncertain Extremely
Unimportant
2. The potential for the individual to personally benefit
from making the decision.
Extremely
Important
Uncertain Extremely
Unimportant
3. The individual's concern about the company's success.
Extremely
Important
Uncertain Extremely
Unimportant
4. A negative attitude toward the group.
Extremely
Important
Uncertain Extremely
Unimportant
5. The need to minimize resentment among workers.
Extremely
Important
Uncertain Extremely
Unimportant
6. The individual's desire to promote her own career.
Extremely
Important
Uncertain Extremely
Unimportant
7. The individual's own values and beliefs about quality
supervisors.
Extremely
Important
Uncertain Extremely
Unimportant
8. The chance that the individual might be rewarded for doing
what the boss wants.
Extremely
Important
Uncertain Extremely
unimportant
Appendix 3: Perceptions of the Target Person Scale
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An important figure in the transcript you just read was the person
who disagreed with the group majority's decision. Based upon what
you have read, how would you describe the person? Place a mark (X)
at the point along the scale which best corresponds with your
opinion.
1. J_
Honest Dishonest
Insincere
3. j i_
Nonopportunistic
Sincere
Opportunistic
Intelligent Unintelligent
Close minded Open minded
Compliant Independent
Unbiased Biased
Principled Unprincipled
Not likeable Likeable
10.
Trustworthy Untrustworthy
11.
Non-manipulative Manipulative
12.
Inconsistent Consistent
13.
Selfish Selfless
14.
Afraid Unafraid
15.
Committed Uncommitted
Appendix E: Opinion Scale
Based on the transcripts you have just read, please respond to 98
the following questions. Place an X at the point along the
line between the dots that best represents your reaction.
1. Rate the strength of the arguments for hiring from outside.
J * « i i 1 J ^Excellent Good Fair Okay Poor Bad Terrible
2. Rate the strength of the arguments for promoting from
within.
Excellent Good Fair Okay Poor Bad Terrible
3. Which side presented the better argument?
Hire from Equal Promote from
Outside Arguments Within
4. What argument convinced you to make that choice?
5. If you had to make the decision, which choice would you
make?
.Promote from Within
.Hire from Outside
.Neither
Explain
Appendix ?: Decision Con>*equcne»s Manipulation Check and Correctness Scale
6. Do you think the group made the correct decision?
Yes No
7. Do you think the individual made the correct decision?
Yes No
8. Do you think the group experienced any bad results for
themselves after making their decision?
Yes No Why?
9. Do you think the individual experienced any bad results for
herself after making her decision?
Yes No Why?
10. Do you think the individual was rewarded for making her
decision?
Yes No Why?
11. Do you think the group was rewarded for making their
decision?
Yes No Why?
12. Do you think the group experienced any good results for
themselves after making their decision?
Yes No why?
13. Do you think the individual experienced any good results forherself after making her decision?
Yes No Why?
14. Do you think the group was punished for their decision?
Yes No Why?
15. Do you think the individual was punished for her decision?
Yes No why?
Appendix G: Study II: Target Person Experiences Negative Consequences
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Food for the Children is a nation-wide volunteer organization that is
dedicated to supplying food and care to starving children in underdeveloped
countries. One of their paid local directors is about to retire and a
committee at the national level have been given the task of deciding on the
best method of finding a replacement.
The discussion focuses on whether they should promote one of the people
from their group of local volunteers or hire a director fran outside the
organization. In the end Carl, Ralph, and Kevin reach one conclusion and Hart
arrives at a different solution.
The transcripts are followed by a short questionnaire concerning the
topic under discussion. Please read the transcripts carefully and fill out
the questionnaire.
Carl: "Well, we all managed to show up on time. What a switch, huh?"
Ralph: "Yeah, I guess the issue we have to decide on here is how to replace
Harvey Johnston when he retires next January. It's complicated by
the fact that we're in a tight financial situation at the moment.
Bob has already emphasized the fact that making the wrong decision
could cost us more money than we can afford to lose."
Mark: "What options are available to us?"
Ralph: "Well, we have two options, as I see it. One, we can hire someone
from outside Food for the Children to take his place or two, we can
promote one of the local volunteers. Anybody see any other choices?"
Carl: "Yeah, we can demote one of ourselves to do the job and save the
organization a lot of money. Any volunteers?"
Mark: "Sure, Carl. I volunteer you. Any other ideas?"
Kevin: "Well, I prefer promoting a local volunteer. I don't think someone
brought in from outside the organization would know enough about Food
for the Children to take over Harvey's job."
Ralph: "Yeah, that's true. A director who never worked here would know less
about our operations than the volunteer working under him. We'd have
to take a lot of time to familiarize him with the organization.
"
Mark: "It would take longer to train a volunteer in organizational skills
than it would to familiarize a new person with the organization. I
think we'd be better off looking for an experienced director from
outside the organization. There are problems with promoting our own
people. Our volunteers may not know enough about running an
organization to take over Harvey's job. They've been working as
volunteers for years—they don't know anything about supervising
people. Just because we have someone who's a reliable volunteer,
that isn't necessarily going to make them a good director. What if
we did promote one of them and he wasn't any good at it? One, we
lose a good volunteer and two, we have a lousy director. That
doesn't make sense,
organization.
"
It wouldn't be fair to the director or the 101
Carl: "I dunno, Mark. I think we owe it to the volunteers to promote than.
It's a way to reward them for loyalty to the organization. Sane of
them have been working with us since we started, you know. They've
certainly earned a chance for promotion after that long. Otherwise
it's a dead-end situation. Promoting one of them for good work would
serve as an incentive for others to do well if they see someone
rewarded for good work."
Ralph: "Yeah, I'm not sure we want to bring in an outsider to start bossing
the volunteers. Like you said, Mark, most of these people have been
working in the field for years. It really wouldn't be fair to just
forget them now. Maybe they're expecting a chance to get promoted
here. It certainly seems like a fair reward to make one of our most
reliable volunteers a supervisor after all these years of loyalty."
Kevin: "Yeah, I like the idea of having an incentive for the other
volunteers."
Mark: "But it's a false incentive! The only reason this job is opening up
is because Harvey is retiring. All the volunteers can't expect to
move into a paid position. Anyway, you guys have to realize, he may
not even want the job. He'd have to start directing all those guys
who' re his friends. I mean, those guys go drinking every Friday and
they hang out together. How's he gonna feel if all the sudden he's
bossing his friends? How' re his friends gonna feel? No one' 11 like
it! It'll break up friendships! I think it would create a lot of
friction if we start singling out one volunteer for promotion over
others.
"
Carl: "But we should be rewarding good work with promotion!"
Mark: "But don't forget, we're supposed to base our decision on the
economics of the situation. The organization can't afford to make
the wrong decison. If we really want to do this right and hire the
best possible person for the job, we need to review as many potential
candidates as possible. The wider range of candidates we have, the
more likely we'll be able to fill the position with the best person
for the job, right? Well, tiie way to do that is to advertise the
position and let people with management experience apply for it. We
shouldn't just restrict ourselves to the population of sixty-two
people we have working in the field. That's not the way to get the
most qualified person."
"Picking someone who doesn't know anything about the organization
won't necessarily be the most economical decision, especially if we
have a lot of unhappy volunteers as a result. Besides, you make it
sound like it'd be unfair to someone to promote them for doing a good
job! It seems fair enough to me. What could be wrong with that? If
you want to talk about fairness, how fair is it to bring in an
outsider, who has never even worked for this organization, and ask
our volunteers to start taking orders from him? Now that's not fair!
You know, if we do bring in this person from outside, that means the
volunteers will know they can never look forward to any promotion. 102
What' 11 that do for morale?"
Mark: "I really think that if we want to get the best person for the job, we
have to open the position up to skilled supervisors outside of Food
for the Children. We can't restrict ourselves to just the limited
number of volunteers we have available in Food for the Children. I'm
not sure we'd find the best person for the job from within the
organization and I think we'd create more problems than we'd solve."
Ralph: "Sorry Mark, but I just can't agree with you. In order to be fair to
our volunteers we should promote one of our most reliable people
locally. It'd be much better for morale."
Kevin: "We have to reach a decision. Personally, I agree with Ralph. I
think the volunteers deserve to be promoted for good work."
Carl: "Me, too."
Ralph: "Well, it looks like we've reached a decision Mark, what do you
think?"
Mark: "You can take that position to Bob if you want, but I can't agree with
it. I guess I'll have to state a minority opinion. I really think
it would be unfair to our volunteers to single out one person for
promotion. Besides, we have such a much broader range of talent if
we go outside the organization. You make a formal statement and then
I'll add my opinion on afterwards."
The group must give their decision to the national director so they have
it typed up. First the majority opinion is outlined, then the dissenting
opinion follows, just as they receive the finished copy, the national
director arrives. He takes a minute to read over the two decisions, then he
says,
"I don't know about Mark's arguments, but the group has raised some
issues that I hadn't even thought of before. I really admire the creativity
that went into them. They're obviously the product of active minds. Of
course, I'll have to think about it sane more before I decide which choice is
the correct decision. This is a very sensitive and complicated issue.
"You know, I was just thinking about who I should send to that island
retreat for executive training. I think that all of you would make very good
candidates I I really don't know about Mark though. I'm not sure that you
have shown executive quality yet."
He shakes his head as he leaves the room.
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This study examined the effects of communicator gender, group
gender, and the consequences of the communication
(benefiting/suffering) on the perceptions, attributions, and
resulting opinions made by observers.
Subjects were presented with the transcript of a conversation
between four people in a simulated management setting. The
discussion revolved around whether the company should hire a
new supervisor from outside the organization or promote an
employee from within the organization to fill the position.
When they concluded, three group members agreed on one solution
and the fourth group member reached a different solution. When
the company president looked it over, he either praised the
individual (target person) for his/her creativity and
denigrated the group of three, or he praised the group for their
creativity and denigrated the target person. This constituted
the decision consequences manipulation. The group gender was
manipulated by having either three males reach one conclusion
or three females. The gender of the target person was also
varied across all conditions.
After the subjects read the transcript, their perceptions of
the target person, their attributions for his/her opinion, and
their opinion on the issue were all measured by questionnaire.
The results showed that ~feta« neither the gender of the target
person, nor the gender of the group members had a significant
effect on subjects' perceptions of the target person, their
attributions for his/her opinion, or their own opinion on the
issue. Instead, the issue of whether the decision was correct
accounted for most of the effects on subjects' opinions. Those
who experienced positive consequences were rated as being
correct and had a subsequent influence on subjects' opinions.
Those who experienced negative consequences were rated as being
incorrect and had no influence on subjects' opinions. When the
setting was changed from business management to a non-profit
organization the opposite results were found. Those who
experienced positive consequences were seen as being incorrect
and had no influence on subjects' opinions. Those who
experienced negative consequences were seen as being correct
and had a subsequent influence on subjects' opinions. Results
were discussed in terms of the effects of profit motive on
subjects' attributions and perceptions.
